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by 
Michelle Lyon Drumbl* 
ABSTRACT 
A taxpayer who is “considered as married” according to the 
Internal Revenue Code’s definition must file either a joint income tax return 
or an individual return using the “married filing separately” filing status. 
Those married taxpayers who file a separate, rather than a joint, income tax 
return are denied valuable benefits and subjected to a host of other 
unfavorable limitations. Low-income taxpayers, in particular, are hurt by 
these limitations. Certain married taxpayers, including victims of domestic 
violence and abandoned spouses, may have no choice but to file using the 
married filing separately status. Low-income taxpayers are denied 
tremendous benefits, such as the earned income tax credit, as they begin to 
rebuild their lives. 
Perhaps intentionally because of these limitations, and in other 
cases perhaps unintentionally by misunderstanding or mistake, some 
taxpayers incorrectly choose single or head of household as their filing 
status when the correct status should have been married filing separately. In 
the context of the earned income tax credit, the cost to the government of this 
particular type of filing status error is estimated to be between $2.3 and $3.3 
billion annually. As currently structured, not unsurprisingly, the limitations 
on the married filing separately filing status create an incentive for this type 
of taxpayer or return preparer noncompliance. 
Further complicating this filing status frustration, the Code imposes 
limitations on how and when married taxpayers may amend their return to 
file a joint return after one or both spouses files a separate return. The 
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Internal Revenue Service applies a restrictive reading of these limitations; 
whether the Service is interpreting the Code correctly remains an open 
question in the courts. 
This Article explores these married taxpayer filing status limitations 
and the collateral consequences thereof. It briefly outlines how and why the 
joint filing option developed and touches upon the concepts of the marriage 
bonus and the marriage penalty. It concludes by proposing three alternative 
models to the current limitations imposed on married taxpayers who choose 
to (or have no choice but to) file separate returns. In each proposal, low-
income taxpayers would have increased access to the credits meant to assist 
them. In addition to increasing fairness, each proposal would reduce or 
remove a structural incentive for taxpayer noncompliance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Married couples can elect to file a joint income tax return, and most 
do. But those who do not, or cannot, file jointly often face adverse tax 
consequences. Taxpayers who file using the married filing separate filing 
status are denied certain significant deductions and credits available to all 
other types of filers.1 Certain other credits and deductions are allowed to 
married filing separately taxpayers, but only under a narrowly defined set of 
circumstances.2 Certain items of income that would be excludible on a joint 
return must be included in income on a married filing separately return.3 A 
1. An Internal Revenue Service (Service) publication provides a list of
these, noting “you usually pay more tax on a separate return than if you use another 
filing status you qualify for.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 501, 
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 7 (2015). Use of 
the married filing separate status precludes a taxpayer from taking the EITC, the 
American opportunity credit, and the lifetime learning credit. I.R.C. §§ 25A, 32(d). It 
additionally precludes a taxpayer from claiming deductions for student loan interest 
and qualified tuition. I.R.C. §§ 221(e)(2), 222(d)(4). 
2. The premium tax credit is a recent and elaborate example of this, and I
address it in detail in Part II.B. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C). Other credits have special 
rules that differ from the Code’s general definition of who is “considered as 
married.” For example, the credit for the elderly and disabled is allowed to a 
taxpayer filing married separately “in the case of a husband and wife who live apart 
at all times during the taxable year.” I.R.C. § 22(e)(1). The child and dependent care 
credit is allowed to a separate filer only if the spouse did not live with the taxpayer 
for the last 6 months of the taxable year and the taxpayer maintains a household for 
more than one-half of the year for a “qualifying person” (as defined in I.R.C.  
§ 21(b)(1)), which is a slightly relaxed version of the definition of a dependent;
taxpayers in some circumstances may meet this definition while failing to meet the 
head of household requirements. I.R.C. § 21(e)(2). Similarly, the adoption tax credit 
is allowed provided that the spouse did not live in the home for the last six months of 
the year, and the taxpayer maintains a household for more than one-half of the year 
for the “eligible child” (as defined in I.R.C. § 23(d)(2)). I.R.C. § 23(f)(1). 
3. A married taxpayer filing separately cannot exclude interest income
from the redemption of qualified U.S. savings bonds used to pay for higher 
education expenses, while taxpayers in all other filing statuses can exclude such 
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married taxpayer who files separately cannot claim the standard deduction 
(which would be one-half that allowed on a joint return) if the taxpayer’s 
spouse itemizes on his or her return.4 
Low-income taxpayers, in particular, are adversely impacted by 
these rules.5 Of perhaps greatest significance, a married taxpayer who 
chooses to (or is forced to) file separately becomes instantly ineligible for the 
earned income tax credit (“EITC”), even if he or she meets all other 
eligibility provisions.6 A married taxpayer filing separately can claim the 
premium tax credit or the child and dependent care expense credit only if 
narrow and cumbersome exceptions are met.7 Each of these three credits 
plays an important safety net function for low-income taxpayers; due to life’s 
complexities and the (sometimes greater) complexities of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code), taxpayers who must file separately may be shut out of 
these credits despite sympathetic circumstances. 
Perhaps in part for these reasons, some taxpayers deliberately 
misrepresent their marital status, choosing single or head of household filing 
status despite not meeting the required criteria for those statuses. In other 
cases, taxpayers are led astray by an incompetent or (more likely) 
unscrupulous tax return preparer who selects the incorrect filing status, 
perhaps doing so without the taxpayer’s knowledge or understanding. As 
currently structured, the disadvantages associated with the married filing 
separate status create an incentive for this type of taxpayer or preparer 
noncompliance. Further complicating this issue, the Code imposes 
limitations on how and when married taxpayers may amend their filing to 
file jointly after one or both spouses has filed a separate return. The Internal 
Revenue Service (Service) applies a restrictive reading of these limitations; 
income up to certain limitations. I.R.C. § 135(d)(3). Likewise, other filers who have 
social security benefits can exclude part or all of the benefits from income according 
to a “base amount,” but a married taxpayer filing separately is not entitled to any 
base amount that may be excluded so long as he or she lived with his or her spouse 
at any time during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 86(c)(1)(C). 
4. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(A).
5. Another disadvantage of married filing separately that is often cited is
that the tax rate table income bands are overall narrower than those for an unmarried 
person. However, in tax year 2014, this rate difference only came into effect once the 
filer’s taxable income exceeded $74,425. Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537. 
While this is surely an additional disincentive for certain taxpayers filing separately, 
this particularity is outside of the scope of this Article because it does not concern 
low-income taxpayers. 
6. I.R.C. § 32(d).
7. I.R.C. §§ 21(e)(2), 36B(c)(1)(C).
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whether the Service is interpreting the Code correctly remains an open 
question.8 
 Curiously, not all income-based credits and deductions are denied to 
a taxpayer who files a married filing separate return. For example, such a 
taxpayer can still benefit from the child tax credit and the retirement savings 
contributions credit.9 While the income threshold for the phase-out of these 
two credits is reduced for a married individual filing separately as compared 
to married individuals filing a joint return,10 this treatment is obviously more 
favorable than an outright denial of eligibility.11 The retirement savings 
contributions credit (sometimes called the “saver’s credit”) is designed 
specifically to benefit low-income taxpayers, in that it has income thresholds 
somewhat similar to the EITC.12 The child tax credit, in contrast, is available 
to low-income taxpayers but also at income levels for certain filers that are 
decidedly not “low-income.”13 
                                                 
8. See infra Part III.D (discussing the recent Eighth Circuit opinion in 
Ibrahim v. Commissioner). 
9. I.R.C. §§ 24, 25B. 
10. In the case of the child tax credit, the threshold amounts are as 
follows: $110,000 for a joint return; $75,000 for an unmarried individual; and 
$55,000 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return. I.R.C. § 24(b)(2). In the case 
of the retirement savings contributions credit, the income thresholds and applicable 
credit percentages are the same for an unmarried taxpayer and a married taxpayer 
who files separately (and double these figures for joint filers). I.R.C. § 25B(b). 
11. In a similar vein, I.R.C. § 121 permits married taxpayers filing 
separately to exclude the gain from the sale of a principal residence, but the 
provision halves the amount that can be excluded by each spouse to $250,000 (as 
compared to $500,000 for joint filers). Likewise, a married taxpayer filing separately 
is allowed a capital loss deduction of $1,500 (as compared to $3,000 for joint filers). 
12. For an unmarried taxpayer or a married taxpayer filing separately in 
2014, the saver’s credit fully phased out at $30,000, while the EITC for an unmarried 
taxpayer with three children fully phased out at $46,997. For a married couple filing 
jointly in 2014, the saver’s credit fully phased out at $60,000, whereas a married 
couple with three or more children is phased out of the EITC at $52,427. Notice 
2013–73, 2013–49 I.R.B. 598; Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537. 
13. As noted supra in footnote 10, on a joint return the child tax credit 
begins to gradually phase out at an adjusted gross income of $110,000. This is more 
than double the adjusted gross income at which the EITC is fully phased out on a 
joint return (as noted supra in footnote 12, in tax year 2014 this figure was $52,427 
for a married couple with three or more children). For a comparison and critique of 
the differences between the EITC and the child tax credit, see Dorothy A. Brown, 
The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755 (2005). 
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This Article will explore some of the problems that arise from the 
Code’s limitations on choosing a filing status, the collateral consequences of 
that status, and the limitations on changing that status after filing. In 
particular, this Article is concerned with low-income taxpayers, as this is the 
most economically vulnerable population and the one that is hurt 
disproportionately by these limitations. Part III addresses the ways in which 
these limitations play a role in taxpayer and preparer noncompliance, 
contributing to the size of the much-criticized “improper payment” rate of 
the EITC.14 According to a Service study of returns filed for tax years 2006-
2008, an estimated five percent of all EITC claimants (constituting 
approximately one million returns) incorrectly chose single or (more 
commonly) head of household status when the correct status should have 
been married filing separately.15 The cost to the government of this specific 
14. In 2014, the estimated error rate on EITC payments was 27.2%,
representing an estimated $17.7 billion in improper payments. Government 
Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, 
Duplication, and Improper Payments and Achieve Other Financial Benefits: 
Testimony of U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO–15–440T) Before the S. Comm. 
on the Budget, 114th Cong. 35 (2015) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller 
General of the United States). As a percentage of outlays, the EITC improper 
payment rate is by far the highest of any government spending program. The error 
rate has been high for more than a decade, and despite a high examination rate of 
EITC returns, the Service has not been able to reduce the error rate. A recent Service 
compliance study concludes that the two most common causes of EITC overclaims 
are income misreporting and qualifying child errors. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUB. NO. 5162 (8-2014), COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR THE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDIT CLAIMED ON 2006–2008 RETURNS 20 [hereinafter COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES]. 
The study indicates that filing status errors are the third most common source of 
error (and a distant third to the first two causes), accounting for an estimated 9 to 
17% of overclaims. Not all filing status errors arise from married taxpayers filing as 
single or head of household; another common filing status error is when an 
unmarried taxpayer erroneously chooses head of household to claim qualifying 
children of his or her significant other (i.e. dependents who are not his or her child or 
stepchild).  
15. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 20. This report explains:
“Five percent of all EITC claimants (two percent of those filing single and nine 
percent of those filing as head-of-household) are estimated to have the correct status 
of married-filing-separately, making them ineligible for the credit.” Id. I discuss the 
significance of this statistic in Part III.D, infra. 
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type of overclaiming is estimated to be between $2.3 and $3.3 billion 
annually.16 
 Part IV of this Article outlines in brief how and why the joint filing 
option developed and touches upon the concepts of the marriage bonus and 
the marriage penalty. For a variety of reasons, some scholars have argued in 
favor of eliminating joint filing and adopting a system of individual filing for 
all. While this author favors such an approach,17 I believe it unlikely that 
Congress will abolish the joint filing option or radically overhaul the current 
filing status structure.  
 This Article concludes in Part V by proposing three alternative 
models to the current limitations imposed on married taxpayers who choose 
to (or have no choice but to) file separately. In each proposal, low-income 
taxpayers would have increased access to the credits meant to assist them. In 
addition to increasing fairness, each proposal also would reduce or remove a 
structural incentive for taxpayer noncompliance. 
 The first proposal I describe builds upon a current provision 
applicable only to certain separate filers who claim the premium tax credit, 
which is the refundable advance credit available to taxpayers who apply for 
health coverage through the Health Insurance Marketplace.18 
The second proposal draws from the example of the Canadian revenue 
system, which provides individual filing for all taxpayers (with no option to 
file jointly) but bases eligibility for a family tax credit on household (rather 
than individual) income. This proposal will show that with information 
sharing between returns, Congress can keep the two “married” filing statuses 
in place but could base all credit eligibility on household income. Thus, a 
married woman who lives with her husband but files separately would be 
entitled to the EITC provided that her husband’s income is also sufficiently 
low as to meet the thresholds that apply to joint filers. In contrast, a married 
                                                 
16. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 19 tbl.5. The estimates 
used in Table 5 of the Service’s Compliance Estimates report treat each different 
EITC overclaim error type in isolation. To provide context to these figures: the 
report averages “returns filed for TY 2006–2008, [and estimates that during that 
period] 23.7 million taxpayers claimed an annual total of $49.3 billion in EITC.” Id. 
at iv. 
17. For my critique of joint and several liability and my argument for 
individual filing in light of the changing demographics of the United States, see 
Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence and 
Income Splitting, 4 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 94 (2012). 
18. For information about the Healthcare Marketplace and the premium 
tax credit, see generally 2015 Health Coverage & Your Federal Taxes, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/taxes/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016). 
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woman who lives separately from her estranged husband would be entitled to 
the EITC based on her own income. At the same time, this proposal calls for 
unmarried cohabitating parents to be subjected to the EITC phase-outs based 
on their combined household income rather than their filing status. As I 
address in the discussion of this proposal, unmarried cohabitating parents (of 
all income levels, including low-income) are in many cases tax-favored 
compared to married couples.19 In this regard, the current Code creates a 
potential economic disincentive for couples of various income levels to 
marry.20 My proposal would not fully correct this disparity, but at least it 
would relieve some of the more egregious examples of inequity faced by 
married taxpayers. This proposal thus would make the married filing 
separately status less punitive in nature, while accomplishing the same 
legislative purposes of the income thresholds and preserving the EITC as an 
anti-poverty measure. 
My third proposal envisions a filing procedure more like the status 
quo U.S. system, but with the significant departure that credits and 
deductions claimed on a married filing separate return would be allowed at 
half the amount permitted to an unmarried taxpayer. In this proposal, a 
married woman who files separately and is a low-earner would be entitled to 
receive half the EITC amount to which an unmarried taxpayer with the same 
individual income is entitled. My proposal allows this even if the married 
taxpayer’s husband’s income is sufficiently high that their combined income 
would make them ineligible for the EITC if they filed jointly. While in this 
case, the wife would benefit from filing separately with her low income, the 
husband simultaneously loses the benefit of income splitting and the more 
favorable rate brackets. At lower household income levels, this proposal 
sometimes would result in a married couple reaping a collective benefit from 
filing separately. Once the household income reaches a higher threshold, 
married taxpayers generally still would fare better by filing a joint return. 
This proposal would make the married filing separately status less punitive in 
nature, and may also create an incentive for both spouses to work, especially 
at the margins of the EITC income phase-out. The advantage of such an 
incentive is discussed in Part V.C. 
19. See Drumbl, supra note 17, at 121.
20. See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The
Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297 (1999) (finding that the 
existence of a ‘marriage tax’ discourages marriage, especially for women, although 
its effect is generally small); James Alm, M. V. Lee Badgett & Leslie A. 
Whittington, Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of Legalizing 
Same-Sex Marriage, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 201, 213 (2000) (“it seems unlikely that taxes 
are the main, or even a major, factor in the marriage decision for most couples”). 
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II. HOW FILING SEPARATELY DISADVANTAGES TAXPAYERS, AND WHY 
SOME TAXPAYERS CANNOT AVOID IT 
 
 A “married individual” can elect to file a single joint return with his 
or her spouse, even if one of the spouses is not required to file a return.21 If 
the election to file jointly is not made, a married individual must file using 
“married filing separate” status.22 Marital status is determined as of the last 
date of the taxable year.23 
 The Code provides three exceptions for when a married individual 
“shall not be considered as married” for purposes of determining filing 
status: 1) “an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of 
divorce or of separate maintenance”;24 2) a taxpayer who maintains and 
furnishes more than one-half the cost for a household which for more than 
one-half the taxable year is the principal place of abode of the taxpayer’s 
child, provided that the taxpayer’s spouse was not a member of that 
household during the last six months of the taxable year;25 and 3) a taxpayer 
whose spouse at any time during the year was a nonresident alien, provided 
that the taxpayer qualifies for head of household status.26 
                                                 
21. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (stating that joint filing is an option “even though one 
of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions”).  
22. Spouses domiciled in one of the nine community property states who 
file separate returns are subject to special rules; they must each report one half of the 
community income in addition to their separate income. I.R.C. § 66. This Article 
does not attempt to address the differences and the complexities that arise in 
community property states. 
23. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1). 
24. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2). 
25. I.R.C. § 7703(b). For this purpose, the spouse is considered to live in 
the home if he or she is “temporarily absent from the household due to special 
circumstances.” Reg. § 1.7703–1(b)(5). “Special circumstances” may include illness, 
education, business, vacation, or military service. Id. Note also that the rule in 
section 7703(b) is more restrictive than the head of household requirement insofar as 
the taxpayer must be entitled to claim a child as a dependent; for this purpose, the 
meaning of child is defined in section 152(f)(1), which includes a son, daughter, 
stepchild, adopted child, or eligible foster child. This is in contrast to section 2(b), 
which provides that an unmarried taxpayer using the head of household status must 
be entitled to claim as a dependent a “qualifying child” as defined in section 152(c), 
which is more expansive in that it includes siblings, nieces, nephews, and 
grandchildren. 
26. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(B). This presumes that the couple did not elect under 
section 6013(g) to treat the nonresident alien spouse as a U.S. resident for tax 
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A.  With All the Disadvantages, Why Would Anyone Elect Married Filing 
Separate Status? 
In the tax year 2012, the Service received 2,663,017 returns of 
married persons filing separately.27 Perhaps a small percentage of these 
taxpayers as couples benefitted from a collectively lower liability due to the 
unusual nature of their situation.28 Far more likely, the couple collectively 
paid more tax but had a compelling nontax reason to make this election, such 
as a desire to keep finances separate or to avoid joint and several liability.29 
But for many taxpayers, choosing this status is not so much an “election” as 
the absence of other viable alternatives. These taxpayers are the primary 
purposes. Note that the spouse is not a qualifying person for purposes of determining 
head of household status; there must be another qualifying dependent in the 
household. I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i). 
27. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS 2012, at 77 tbl.1.6 (2014). 
28. The oft-cited example of when a married couple may benefit from
separate returns is when one spouse has a low income and also significant deductions 
that are subject to an adjusted gross income (AGI) floor. For example, section 213 
provides that certain medical expenses are deductible (as an itemized deduction) to 
the extent the expenses exceed 10% of the taxpayer’s AGI. On a joint return, the 
couple’s AGI would be the floor for calculating the deduction. On a separate return, 
the individual taxpayer’s AGI would be used; thus, if both spouses had income, a 
greater portion of the expense would exceed the floor. Of course, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the taxpayers would collectively benefit from this. There are many 
other factors in computing the respective liabilities, so the benefit of the higher 
medical expense deduction may be offset by any number of things, including a 
collectively less preferential rate structure, the missed opportunity for income 
splitting, and the fact that both spouses must itemize if one spouse does so. 
29. Another compelling nontax reason is if one spouse has student loans
with income based repayment (IBR). Under current law, if married spouses file 
separately, the repayment is based on separate income (whereas it is based on joint 
income for joint filers). See Peter J. Reilly, Something Borrowed Makes You Blue—
Student Debt and Joint Returns, FORBES.COM, (July 5, 2015, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/07/05/something-borrowed-makes-
you-blue-student-debt-and-joint-returns/. See also Victoria J. Haneman, The 
Collision of Student Loan Debt and Joint Marital Taxation, 35 VA. TAX REV. 223, 
227 (2016) (arguing that “allowing a married borrower to qualify for PAYE/IBR and 
loan forgiveness on the basis of a separately filed tax return is problematic” due to 
the other disadvantages of the married filing separately status and describing how 
female borrowers suffer a twofold penalty due to the gender pay gap and secondary 
earner bias). 
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concern of this Article, and the following section describes different 
categories of taxpayers who are “considered as married” (under the Code 
definition set forth above) but lack viable alternatives at filing time. 
1. Separated, but Not Legally So
A married taxpayer who is living apart from his or her spouse but not 
legally separated is not able to file as single.30 He or she might be eligible to 
file using head of household status, but only if he or she meets the 
requirements for that status and additionally meets one of the two exceptions 
described above.31 For example, a taxpayer who has been living apart from 
his or her spouse (and is not legally separated) for less than the last six 
months of the tax year cannot use the head or household status because he or 
she does not meet the criteria in order to “not be considered as married” for 
purposes of section 7703(b). For a parent living with children, this is a costly 
restriction. And even in cases in which one spouse does meet the definition 
to “not be considered as married” because the children live with him or her 
and the other requirements are met, the other spouse does not benefit; the 
noncustodial spouse is still considered to be married (absent a legal 
separation) and must file a separate return. 
For low-income taxpayers, in particular, the cost or lack of access to legal 
assistance may make a court-ordered separation and subsequent divorce 
prohibitive. For this and many other reasons, some couples (at all income 
levels) part ways without completing this legal formality and remain 
married.32 
Unless they meet the Code’s criteria to be considered 
unmarried, these taxpayers are legally required to file as married filing 
separately, and a return preparer is ethically bound to use that status if the 
30. The Code contains a special provision for a married taxpayer whose
spouse is in “missing status” due to service in a combat zone; these taxpayers can 
elect to file a joint return under a very narrowly defined set of circumstances. I.R.C. 
§ 6013(f).
31. I.R.C. §§ 7703(b), 2(b)(2)(B); supra note 25 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Pamela Paul, The Un-Divorced, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/fashion/01Undivorced.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=1 (citing several scenarios of couples who split up but do not divorce, and noting 
that such couples are “irrefutably bound by contractual links on issues like taxes”). 
See also Tumin et al., Estimates and Meanings of Marital Separation,77 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 312, 313 (2015) (noting that for some couples “marital 
separation may become an alternative to divorce, lasting for many years without 
resolving in either divorce or reconciliation”). 
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taxpayer discloses this detail. The Code does not provide any exception or 
safe harbor for these taxpayers, though they may conceptualize themselves as 
unmarried and certainly are no longer in a financial partnership with their 
legal spouse. 
2. Spouse Refuses to Sign; Spousal Abuse
Among its other ills, domestic violence creates terrible dilemmas for 
taxpayers. Spousal abuse can include physical abuse as well as control, 
intimidation, and forms of emotional manipulation. Women or men suffering 
in such a relationship dynamic may be forced by an abusive spouse to sign a 
joint return against their better judgment. In such cases, the abused spouse 
later may be eligible for relief from joint liability by making a request for 
innocent spouse relief.33 
Conversely, the abusive partner may refuse to provide financial 
information or participate in the filing process with his or her spouse, leaving 
the abused taxpayer with no recourse but to file a separate return. In other 
cases, victims of domestic violence may have fled the relationship yet remain 
legally married, and in such cases, they do not wish to contact the spouse to 
coordinate a joint return.34 
In recognition of these circumstances, the Treasury promulgated regulations 
to provide a special exception to victims of spousal abuse who claim the 
premium tax credit but must (or choose to) file a separate return. As detailed 
in Part II.B.2, this exception is a relatively recent and extremely important 
development for domestic violence victims, but it is limited only to the 
premium tax credit. This exception serves as the model for one of the 
proposals set forth in Part V.35 
33. See generally I.R.C. § 6015.
34. See, e.g., Letter from Futures Without Violence to the Internal
Revenue Service 1 (October 27, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=I
RS-2014-0025-0015 (stating “Many domestic violence victims remain legally 
married even after they have fled their abusive relationship. Their spouse may not 
grant a divorce; they may be too afraid to ask for a divorce; or not enough time may 
have passed to be granted a divorce”).  
35. See also Mary Leto Pareja, Beyond the Affordable Care Act’s
Premium Tax Credit: Ensuring Access to Safety Net Programs, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 
241, 284 (2015) (describing the premium tax credit’s exceptions and arguing that 
such an exception should be expanded to allow domestic violence victims to claim 
other benefits, including the EITC, that are typically lost by filing separately). 
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          3.  Spousal Abandonment 
 
 A married taxpayer who was abandoned by his or her spouse is still 
“considered as married” if he or she: 1) was abandoned within the last six 
months of the tax year (even if the taxpayer heads a separate household with 
his or her children); or 2) does not have dependent children. Yet, a taxpayer 
obviously cannot elect to file a joint return with someone who is absent and 
uncooperative and, thus, is forced to file a married filing separate return. 
In response to comments it received following the proposed regulations 
creating a spousal abuse exception for taxpayers filing separately and 
claiming the premium tax credit, the Treasury expanded the exception to 
include spouses who have been abandoned and cannot locate their spouse. 
Again, this exception is significant in that it recognizes a category of 
taxpayer that has no option to file jointly; but as with victims of spousal 
abuse, the exception is limited to the premium tax credit. 
 
          4.  U.S. Person Married to Nonresident Alien, If Head of Household 
Status Is Not Available and No Election Is Made Under 6013(g) 
 
 Section 6013(a)(1) provides that a joint return cannot be made if one 
of the spouses is a nonresident alien. The U.S. resident spouse is allowed to 
file using head of household status if he or she otherwise qualifies for it.36 
This is true despite the fact that the spouses live in the household together; 
this rule represents a beneficial exception not available to two U.S. resident 
spouses. 
 Section 6013(g) provides the opportunity for an election to treat the 
nonresident spouse as a U.S. resident for tax purposes. Such an election 
would make the nonresident spouse subject to U.S. taxation of his or her 
worldwide income regardless of source, and it generally would preclude the 
nonresident from electing benefits under a U.S. income tax treaty. As such 
this may be a very undesirable election for some families.37 
                                                 
36. I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(B); see supra note 26. 
37. The possible scenarios and the tax consequences of making the 
election to be treated as a U.S. resident are varied and full of nuance. A full 
discussion of this category, and of the differences in the taxation of resident and 
nonresident aliens, is outside the scope of this Article. That said, the statutory 
distinction made with respect to filing status and these couples is worth bearing in 
mind. 
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Absent the election, and without a dependent in the household that would 
qualify the taxpayer for head of household filing status, the U.S. resident 
spouse has no choice but to file married filing separately. 
5. Lack of Access to Tax Advice; Lack of Planning; Misinformed
Decision Making 
Many low-income taxpayers are unsophisticated and lack formal 
education in financial matters. Many rely on friends or family for tax advice, 
and this advice is often ill-informed even if well-intended. Not all taxpayers 
speak English or can read it well enough to understand how to navigate the 
instructions on an income tax return. 
Some of these taxpayers choose to self-prepare their taxes due to the 
cost of professional tax return preparation. Some of these taxpayers let a 
friend or family member prepare the return on their behalf. Others rely on 
questionable return preparers and lack the tools to understand, or the 
confidence to challenge, what the return preparer presents for signature. The 
low-cost tax preparation industry is replete with misinformation, preparer 
fraud, and questionable advice.38 Thus, low-income taxpayers may not fully 
appreciate what is at stake for them or be aware of the consequences of filing 
incorrectly or inconsistently. 
Many tax provisions available to low-income taxpayers are complex, 
and generally these taxpayers lack access to reliable tax advice. While free 
income tax return preparation is available at Service-sponsored sites such as 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the 
Elderly (TCE), a surprisingly small percentage of taxpayers take advantage 
of these valuable resources.39 
As Part III will discuss in detail, taxpayers who lack (or do not seek) 
access to informed and competent tax advice may make ill-informed 
decisions as to filing status. Once the decision is made, the Code places 
limitations on the ability for these taxpayers to later change their filing status 
to married filing jointly. 
38. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RIDDLED RETURNS:
HOW ERRORS AND FRAUD BY PAID TAX PREPARERS PUT CONSUMERS AT RISK AND 
WHAT STATES CAN DO (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-
riddled-returns.pdf. 
39. An estimated three percent of EITC returns are prepared by Service-
sponsored return preparation sites. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 25 
tbl.8. 
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6. Mutual Fear of Joint Liability, Lack of Trust, or Preference to Keep
Things Separate 
Some married couples live together but choose to keep finances—
and tax filings—separate. This preference may be for any number of reasons, 
ranging from a deep individual sense of independence, to a lack of trust, to a 
deliberate and rational choice to avoid joint liabilities.40 Unlike the other 
categories I describe, couples in this scenario are truly making an election 
and do not evoke the same sympathies as married taxpayers who have no 
choice but to file separately. It is worth considering, however, whether the 
current rules are too punitive for this category of taxpayers as well. My third 
proposal, set forth in Part V, is broad enough to benefit certain taxpayers in 
this category; I argue there are compelling policy reasons to allow such a 
benefit. 
B.  How Are Low-Income Individuals in Particular Impacted by the 
Limitations on the Separate Filing Status? 
The introduction describes a number of credits and deductions that 
are denied to married taxpayers who file separately. This Section discusses 
three of these Code provisions in greater detail: the EITC; the premium tax 
credit; and the special rules regarding itemized deductions for married filing 
separate filers. 
The EITC is the most financially significant to low-income 
taxpayers, as it is a refundable credit designed to serve as an anti-poverty 
program. The premium tax credit is a relatively new refundable credit 
designed to assist lower-income taxpayers who buy health insurance through 
the Affordable Care Act’s marketplace. It merits special attention in this 
Article because Congress made it unavailable to married persons filing 
separately, and the Treasury and Service have given great thought to creating 
appropriate exceptions to this rule. The provision requiring married 
40. Another dynamic that may fall in this category is a couple that
remains married and continues to live together but that no longer has a romantic 
partnership. One reason such couples remain in a household together is that it is “too 
expensive to divorce”; the individuals wish to continue sharing expenses, but they 
function more as roommates rather than a true economic unit. These couples may 
benefit financially from joint filing, but by making that election they must take on 
joint and several liability. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Marriage Economy: “I 
Couldn’t Afford to Get Divorced,” NPR (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/20/144021297/marriage-economy-i-couldnt-afford-to-
get-divorced. 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   21 12/21/2016   6:16:43 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 415 
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately 
taxpayers filing separately to itemize if their spouse itemizes can pose 
challenges to filers who are estranged from their spouse; this impacts all 
separate filers, but can have a harsh financial impact on low-income filers, 
who are less likely to have a significant amount in itemized deductions. 
1. Earned Income Tax Credit
The predecessor to today’s EITC was enacted as a temporary 
program in 1975.41 Made permanent in 1978,42 Congress has expanded the 
credit several times since then.43 In scope and size, it has grown into one of 
the most significant federal anti-poverty benefit programs in the United 
States.44 The legislative history describes the early proposals of the credit as 
having two objectives: (1) “as a way of decreasing work disincentives” for 
persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the regressive nature of 
social security taxes.45 The maximum EITC available in 1975 was $400, and 
41. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209(b), 89 Stat. 26,
35. While this is commonly referred to as the birth of the EITC, I learned from
Bryan Camp that there was a refundable version of the earned income tax credit in 
the mid-1920s. 
42. The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, § 103(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2771. 
43. For a summary of the legislative history of the EITC, see CHRISTINE
SCOTT & MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31768, THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): AN OVERVIEW app. A (2014). The EITC has 
been amended and expanded several times, most notably by the following 
legislation: The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 11111, 104 Stat. 1388,1408 (expanding the credit for families with two or more
qualifying children); The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-66, §13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433 (raising credit amounts and expanding EITC to 
include a modest credit for childless workers); The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §1002, 123 Stat. 115, 312 
(temporarily expanding the credit to allow a taxpayer to claim three or more 
qualifying children); The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
113, § 103 129 Stat. 2242, 3044 (making permanent the expansion to three or more 
qualifying children and the increased income phase-out for married taxpayers filing 
jointly). 
44. SCOTT & CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 43, at 17 (citing KAREN
SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41625, FEDERAL BENEFITS AND SERVICES FOR 
PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME: PROGRAMS, POLICY, AND SPENDING, FY2008–FY2009 
(2011)). 
45. JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 94TH CONG., JCS-8-75, 
ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 (H.R. 
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it was available only to low-income taxpayers (both unmarried and married) 
with a dependent child in their household.46 The credit began to phase out if 
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeded $4,000, and a taxpayer with 
an adjusted gross income of $8,000 or more would receive no credit at all. 
As is still the case today, the credit as originally introduced was available to 
a married couple only if a joint return was filed; a couple filing separately 
could not receive the credit.47 
Why prevent a married couple filing separately from receiving the 
credit? Most likely, Congress wanted to keep the credit simple to administer 
and ensure that a married couple did not unduly benefit. The House 
Committee on Ways and Means report provided: 
The credit is to be calculated on a return-by-return basis. Individuals 
who are married and filing a joint return are eligible for only one 
credit on the combined income of both individuals. Married 
individuals filing separate returns are not eligible for the credit. A 
married individual who is treated as not being married (under sec. 
143(b)) for return-filing purposes (i.e., a head of a household whose 
spouse has not been a member of the household for the entire year) is 
eligible for the credit in the same manner as a single individual (and 
any of the absent spouse's income attributed to him under State 
community property laws is to be disregarded).48 
2166) AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 33 (1975). See also S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 11 
(1975) (elaborating on the EITC as follows: “This new refundable credit will provide 
relief to families who currently pay little or no income tax. These people have been 
hurt the most by rising food and energy costs. Also, in almost all cases, they are 
subject to the social security payroll tax on their earnings. Because it will increase 
their after-tax earnings, the new credit, in effect, provides an added bonus or 
incentive for low-income people to work, and therefore, should be of importance in 
inducing individuals with families receiving Federal assistance to support 
themselves. Moreover, the refundable credit is expected to be effective in stimulating 
the economy because the low-income people are expected to spend a large fraction 
of their increased disposable incomes.”). 
46. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30.
As originally enacted, it appeared in § 43 of the Code. The EITC is currently found 
in I.R.C. § 32. 
47. I.R.C. § 43(d) (1975).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 30–31 (1975). Senate Report 94-36 contains
nearly identical language with no further elaboration. S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 35. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, the child tax credit does not have 
such a restriction—married filing separate filers can claim it, and the income 
phase-out for those filers is one-half the amount allowed to joint filers.49 
While the married filing separate phase-out is set at a lower income than the 
phase-out set for unmarried filers, this rule makes far more sense than does 
denying the credit based on filing status. There is no compelling 
administrative reason for the Code to deny the EITC to married filing 
separate filers while allowing those same filers another refundable credit that 
is also subject to income limitations. 
Currently, the EITC is most significant to taxpayers with children; 
the benefit is far less valuable for taxpayers without a qualifying child.50 In 
2014, the maximum EITC available to a taxpayer with no qualifying child 
was $496 (in contrast to the maximum of $6,143 available to a taxpayer with 
three or more qualifying children). The $496 maximum begins to phase out 
at an adjusted gross income exceeding $8,150 (or $13,550 in the case of a 
joint return), and phases out completely once the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income reaches $14,590 (or $20,020 in the case of a joint return). Notably, 
however, there have been recent proposals from both Republicans and 
Democrats to increase the EITC amount available to taxpayers without 
qualifying children.51 If this legislation were to pass, the need to adopt a 
proposal for relief for these married taxpayers who live apart and file 
separately will be even more compelling. 
49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
50. “Qualifying child” is defined in I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) to include
children, stepchildren, siblings, stepsiblings, and descendants of any of the above. 
51. These include a proposal in President Obama’s FY 2015 budget;
Congressman Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) Expanding Opportunity in America proposed 
doubling the maximum credit, phase-in, and phase-out rates for childless adults; and 
proposals from several Democrats including Senators Brown (D-OH), Durbin (D-
IL), and Murray (D-WA), Congressman Neal (D-MA), and Congressman Rangel (D-
NY). See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, THE PRESIDENT’S 
PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report_0.pdf; Expanding 
Opportunity in America: Discussion Draft from the House Budget Comm., 113th 
Cong. 24–29 (2014) (draft by Chairman Paul Ryan); CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING 
HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STRENGTHENING THE EITC FOR 
CHILDLESS WORKERS WOULD PROMOTE WORK AND REDUCE POVERTY 1 & n. 4 
(2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-15-13tax.pdf 
(discussing various proposals of Democratic senators). 
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2. Premium Tax Credit
The premium tax credit, enacted as part of the Affordable Care 
Act,52 is intended to ensure that health coverage is affordable to low-income 
individuals by offsetting the costs of purchasing health insurance.53 The 
statute provides that taxpayers who are married (within the meaning of Code 
section 7703) must file a joint return in order to be eligible for the credit.54 
This filing status restriction was not in the original version of the Senate bill 
(the “America’s Healthy Future Act,” sometimes known as the “Baucus 
Health Plan,” which was introduced on September 16, 2009), but then it 
appears in the version passed as amended by the Senate Finance Committee 
on October 19, 2009.55 The language imposing the restriction remains the 
same in the final version of the Affordable Care Act. 
The Treasury issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of 
public hearing on the premium tax credit in August of 2011.56 The preamble 
to these proposed regulations requested comments on rules for reconciling 
the premium tax credit with advance payments for taxpayers whose filing 
status changes during the taxable year, including those “who face challenges 
in being able to file a joint return.”57 The preamble acknowledged that not all 
married persons are able to file a joint return: 
Some taxpayers who are married at the time they enroll in a qualified 
health plan and begin to receive advance credit payments may not be 
52. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010). Together with the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1030, 
these are collectively known as the Affordable Care Act. The credit is codified at 
I.R.C. § 36B. 
53. S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., EXPANDING HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE: PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE AFFORDABLE COVERAGE TO ALL AMERICANS 
11 (Comm. Print 2009). For purposes of the premium tax credit, “low-income” 
includes individuals with a household income between 100 and 400% of the federal 
poverty level for the taxpayer’s family size. Id. 
54. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C) provides: “If the taxpayer is married (within the
meaning of section 7703) at the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer shall be 
treated as an applicable taxpayer only if the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s spouse file a 
joint return for the taxpayer year.” 
55. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 151–52 (2009).
56. Prop. Reg. § 1.36B–1 to –5, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931–49 (Aug. 17, 2011).
57. Id. at 50,937.
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able to file a joint return for the coverage year. For example, in 
situations involving domestic abuse, when a divorce is pending but 
not yet final, or when one spouse is incarcerated, filing a joint return 
may not be possible or prudent.58 
The preamble to the Treasury regulations issued in May 2012 
provided a summary of the comments received in response to the notice of 
proposed rulemaking.59 Commenters suggested there should be special rules 
or exceptions for the circumstances noted in the proposed regulation 
preamble and additionally suggested that abandoned spouses should be 
eligible for such an exception from the credit’s joint filing requirement.60 The 
regulations promulgated in 2012 did not include such an exception, but the 
preamble noted that further regulations would be forthcoming to address 
those issues. In March 2014, the Service released interim guidance for 
married victims of domestic abuse.61 A few months later, the Treasury issued 
temporary regulations adopting the rules set forth in the Service’s interim 
guidance for victims of domestic abuse and also amending the 2012 
regulations to include an exception for victims of spousal abandonment.62 
58. Id. at 50,938.
59. T.D. 9590, 2012–24 I.R.B. 986.
60. Id. at 994. For an unofficial transcript of the testimony at the
November 17, 2011, public hearing, see Health Plan Affordability Test Focus of IRS 
Hearing, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-19 (Nov. 18, 2011). Two of the speakers 
addressed this concern. Tara Straw, who at the time was the Legislative and Policy 
Director for Health Care for America Now, noted: “Abandoned spouses also warrant 
special protection. Some individuals have no choice but to file a separate return when 
they cannot locate their spouse. This is a foreign concept in a lot of communities, but 
I see this case at least once a week at my [volunteer tax return preparation] tax site.” 
Id. 
61. Notice 2014–23, 2014–16 I.R.B 942.
62. T.D. 9683, 2014–33 I.R.B. 330. The temporary regulations requested
further comments on the “appropriateness of the relief provided in the temporary 
regulations, and the appropriateness of the scope of relief, including the 
circumstances that would make a taxpayer eligible for relief.” Id. at 331. 
Regulations.gov (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:59 PM), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D=IRS-2014-0025-0002) reports that 17 comments were received, and the content of 
these is available at that site. Commenters voiced support for the regulations and 
applauded the fact that the agency was mindful of these issues; many commenters 
called for the rule to be broader still. I discuss some of the specific comments in Part 
V, infra, in connection with my proposal that builds on the premium tax credit 
exceptions. 
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These temporary regulations provide that a married taxpayer living 
apart from his or her spouse at the time the return is filed who is a victim of 
domestic abuse or spousal abandonment “satisfies the joint filing 
requirement” of the premium tax credit if he or she files a married filing 
separately return and certifies on the return that he or she meets the criteria 
for the exception.63 The preamble to the temporary regulations explains that 
the definition of “spousal abuse” provided in the temporary regulations is 
based on the definition used for innocent spouse relief.64 Spousal 
abandonment is separately defined.65 The temporary regulations include a 
three-year rule applicable to both spousal abuse and abandonment: the 
married taxpayer may not avail him or herself of this special exception to 
joint filing for more than three consecutive tax years.66 
To certify eligibility for the exception, taxpayers are instructed to 
check a box labeled “relief” on the top right corner of I.R.S. Form 8962 
(Premium Tax Credit).67 Service guidance advises taxpayers claiming such 
relief to keep records documenting that the criteria for the exception are met, 
but does not require the taxpayer to submit the records with the return. 
Publication 974 suggests the following examples of records “that may be 
useful,” noting that not all records apply in any given circumstance: 
x protective and/or restraining order
x police report
63. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(ii), 79 Fed. Reg. 43,622, 43,627.
64. T.D. 9683, supra note 62, at 331. The preamble notes that the
definition used is based on Rev. Proc. 2013–34, 2013–2 C.B. 397. Id. The definition 
is provided in temporary regulation § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(iii): 
For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, domestic abuse 
includes physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse, including 
efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate, or to undermine the 
victim’s ability to reason independently. All the facts and circumstances 
are considered in determining whether an individual is abused, including 
the effects of alcohol or drug abuse by the victim’s spouse. Depending on 
the facts and circumstances, abuse of the victim’s child or another family 
member living in the household may constitute abuse of the victim. 
65. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(iv) defines abandonment as follows:
“For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, a taxpayer is a victim of spousal 
abandonment for a taxable year if, taking into account all facts and circumstances, 
the taxpayer is unable to locate his or her spouse after reasonable diligence.” 
66. Temp. Reg. § 1.36B–2T(b)(2)(v), 79 Fed. Reg. at 43,627.
67. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 974, PREMIUM TAX CREDIT
(PTC) (2015). 
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x doctor’s report or letter
x A statement from someone who was aware of, or who
witnessed, the abuse or the results of the abuse. The 
statement should be notarized if possible.  
x A statement from someone who knows of the
abandonment. The statement should be notarized if 
possible.68 
This exception protecting victims of spousal abuse and abandonment 
is significant, as it is the only such exception to a rule limiting or denying 
credits or deductions to married taxpayers filing separate returns. This 
represents a very positive option for those taxpayers who qualify, provided 
of course that they are aware that this exception exists. As I propose in Part 
V, this exception and its procedural mechanism should serve as a model for 
allowing those taxpayers who meet the criteria to also receive the EITC (and 
other credits and deductions that are otherwise denied to separate filers). 
Taxpayers who meet these criteria are particularly sympathetic in that they 
cannot elect to file jointly and likely do not receive financial support from 
their spouse and yet cannot claim the credits allowed to a similarly situated 
taxpayer who can file as unmarried or head of household. 
3. Limitations on Claiming the Standard Deduction
Married taxpayers who file separate returns cannot claim the 
standard deduction if their spouse itemizes his or her deductions.69 This is 
sound policy for couples who live together and act as one economic unit: if 
this were allowed and one spouse had a significant amount of itemized 
deductions to claim, the government would face a whipsaw if the other 
spouse were allowed to claim a standard deduction. 
While this limitation is sound policy in that scenario, it is harsh if the 
couple is living separately and not acting as an economic unit. It is likely to 
disproportionately punish a low-income spouse, who is less likely to have 
high expenses such as home mortgage interest and state income taxes.70 In 
68. Id. at 7–8.
69. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6).
70. Among all filers, approximately 30% of taxpayers itemize deductions.
As estimated by tax bracket for tax year 2010, itemizers equal 3.9% of taxpayers in 
the 0% bracket, 16.2% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket, and 37% of taxpayers in the 
15% bracket. Benjamin H. Harris & Daniel Baneman, Who Itemizes Deductions?, 
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some cases, this limitation is completely impractical for taxpayers to 
navigate: a couple that is estranged may not be on speaking terms with each 
other, so might not have access to information such as whether the spouse 
itemized in a particular year. This is particularly true in the case of abusive 
relationships or abandonment. 
Ideally, married taxpayers filing separately who live apart and 
maintain separate households should be allowed to claim the standard 
deduction regardless of whether their spouse itemizes. The proposals that 
follow in Part V address the appropriateness of this in each scenario. 
III. LIMITATIONS ON CHANGING ONE’S MIND: SECTION 6013
In Section A of Part II, I discussed some of the reasons that a 
taxpayer might knowingly use married filing separate status, highlighting in 
particular those situations in which married taxpayers do not have a viable 
choice to file jointly. 
I also highlighted the possibility that some low-income taxpayers do 
not make the choice knowingly.71 As a result, some married couples file 
separately (including sometimes incorrectly as head of household and single) 
even though the couple lives together and may even have benefited by the 
election of a joint return. 
A different permutation on using the incorrect filing status is that 
some low-income taxpayers knowingly engage in noncompliance because 
they recognize that in their situation the best outcome is to file as unmarried. 
In this context, the income limitation on joint filers claiming EITC creates a 
structural incentive for a dual-earner couple to incorrectly represent 
themselves as unmarried on individual returns so that they can each benefit 
from the EITC (whereas they would face the income phase-out if they filed a 
joint return). Leslie Book refers to this type of noncompliance as “symbolic 
noncompliance,” which he defines as “intentional non-compliance that 
taxpayers commit to address perceived injustices in the system.”72 
So what happens if the taxpayer later changes his or her mind? 
Perhaps he or she has a change of heart about the intentional 
130 TAX NOTES 345 (Jan. 17, 2011). See also SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43012, ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 3 
(2014) (showing 32% of filers itemized in 2011; among filers with adjusted gross 
income up to $20,000, only 6% itemized; among filers with adjusted gross income 
between $20,000 and $50,000, 22% itemized). 
71. See supra Part II.A.5.
72. Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1176 (2007). 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   29 12/21/2016   6:16:43 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 423 
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately 
misrepresentation. Perhaps he or she becomes better informed of the 
consequences of filing using an unmarried filing status. Perhaps a separated 
couple reconciles and wishes to file a joint return after having filed using 
married filing separate status or even using an unmarried filing status, such 
as head of household. 
Until 1951, a married taxpayer could not change his or her mind 
after filing: the choice to file jointly or separately was irrevocable.73 In 1951, 
Congress amended section 51 (the predecessor to what is currently section 
6013) to allow a change from a separate return to a joint one.74 In describing 
the reason for the amendment, the Senate report noted that “a proper election 
frequently requires informed tax knowledge not possessed by the average 
person” and that the binding election “may result in substantially excessive 
taxes.”75 In interpreting section 6013, courts have cited this language from 
the legislative history.76 
Section 51(g) (which became section 6013 with the enactment of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954) provided taxpayers the flexibility to change 
from separate returns to a joint return, but Congress also imposed limitations 
on changing one’s mind. While it is generally allowed within a certain time 
period, it is not possible in all cases. Those taxpayers who cannot change 
their mind and amend to file jointly are irrevocably stuck with the negative 
consequences of their decision. 
In its current iteration, section 6013(b)(1) provides that a taxpayer 
who has filed “a separate return” in a year for which a joint return could have 
been filed can later decide to make a joint return, except in four prohibited 
situations, which are as follows: 
(A) after the expiration of 3 years from the last date prescribed by 
law for filing the return for such taxable year (determined without 
regard to any extension of time granted to either spouse); or 
73. See Glaze v. U.S., 641 F.2d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 1981); S. REP. NO. 82-
781 (1951), as reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2018 (Westlaw). 
74. I.R.C. § 51(g) (1951).
75. S. REP. NO. 82-781, as reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2018
(Westlaw). This remark referred both to the election to file a joint return and also the 
election to take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing deductions; prior to the 
enactment of Revenue Act of 1951 (Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 312, 65 Stat. 452, 488–90 
(1951)); both elections were binding. 
76. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 788 F.3d 834, 839 (8th Cir.
2015); Morgan v. Commissioner, 807 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1986); Glaze v. United 
States, 641 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433, 
441 (1986); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1401 (1970). 
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(B) after there has been mailed to either spouse, with respect to such 
taxable year, a notice of deficiency under section 6212, if the spouse, 
as to such notice, files a petition with the Tax Court within the time 
prescribed in section 6213; or 
(C) after either spouse has commenced a suit in any court for the 
recovery of any part of the tax for such taxable year; or 
(D) after either spouse has entered into a closing agreement under 
section 7121 with respect to such taxable year, or after any civil or 
criminal case arising against either spouse with respect to such 
taxable year has been compromised under section 7122.77 
Of these four situations, the first two can have a particularly punitive 
outcome for certain taxpayers who may regret their choice or inaction. The 
next Section of this Article will explain two common scenarios in which 
misguided or ill-informed low-income taxpayers choose to file separately (or 
perhaps incorrectly as head of household) instead of jointly when the latter 
option would have been correct and benefitted them more. 
 Following that, the next two Sections below describe the particular 
burdens of the time limitation and the notice of deficiency limitation. This 
Part then concludes with a discussion of a surprisingly unsettled issue: how 
the Service and different courts interpret the term “separate return” for 
purposes of 6013(b)(2). 
A.  Common Scenarios in Which Married Taxpayers File Separately and 
Then Later Wish to Amend 
In my work as director of a low-income taxpayer clinic, I encounter 
two common scenarios in which married couples are likely to disadvantage 
themselves by filing separately when there is no compelling reason to do so. 
In each scenario, the couples would benefit from the advice of a competent 
tax professional at the time of filing, but it is uncommon for low-income 
taxpayers to seek or receive such advice. 
Scenario one involves married couples in which one spouse (more 
often than not, the wife) files a timely return and the other (more typically 
the husband) is a nonfiler. Commonly, the filing spouse is a wage earner 
subject to information reporting and withholding by the employer, while the 
nonfiler is an independent contractor subject to the self-employment tax. The 
filer makes one of two choices: she files correctly (but to her disadvantage) 
using the “married filing separate” status, or she files incorrectly using the 
77. I.R.C. § 6013(b)(2).
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“head of household” status. If a low-income couple78 has dependent children, 
by filing a joint return it may be possible that the personal exemptions, the 
standard deduction, the EITC, and the child tax credit would combine to 
offset (in part or whole) the self-employment tax and the lack of withholding. 
However, a couple who lacks proper information and tax advice does not 
realize this; fearing a tax bill because of the self-employment tax and the 
absence of withholding, the taxpayers make a decision to file as unmarried or 
as married separate (or a decision for one to file and one not to file). 
Assuming the independent contractor receives an I.R.S. Form 1099, the 
Service will eventually discover the nonfiler and pursue an assessment 
through the substitute for return procedure.79 By then, however, it may be too 
late for the taxpayers to amend and file jointly. 
Scenario two involves a married couple in which one spouse has 
outstanding individual debt (i.e. not a joint debt) that is subject to the 
Treasury Offset Program. This may include outstanding federal or state 
income tax liabilities, past-due child support, or federal student loan debt.80 
Often these couples are good candidates for an injured spouse allocation, 
which is a procedure allowing spouses to file a joint return and request that 
the non-liable spouse receive his or her allocable portion of the joint refund 
due (while the liable spouse’s allocable portion is offset).81 However, the 
couple is often either unaware of this option or does not know how to request 
it.82 In this scenario, the non-liable spouse mistakenly believes it better to use 
married filing separately than to file jointly and lose part or all of the 
expected refund. However, in doing so, the non-liable spouse suffers the 
78. In this context, the term “low-income” is intended to include any
couple eligible for the EITC. According to census data, this may include around one-
third of taxpayers with one or more children. Maggie R. Jones, Changes in EITC 
Eligibility and Participation, 2005–2009, at 18 tbl.6 (U.S. Census Bureau, Ctr. for 
Admin. Records Research & Applications, Working Paper No. 2014–04, 2014), 
http://www.census.gov/srd/carra/Changes_in_EITC_Eligibility_and_Participation_2
005-2009.pdf. 
79. I.R.C. § 6020(b).
80. I.R.C. § 6402(d).
81. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 285.2(f) and (g); Rev. Rul. 85–70, 1985–1 C.B. 361;
I.R.M. 25.15.1.2.5 (section regarding relief from joint and several liability: injured 
spouse claims). The allocation formula is described in the Internal Revenue Manual 
in a section entitled, “Calculating the Injured Spouse's Share of the Overpayment.” 
I.R.M. 25.18.5.3. 
82. The taxpayer should request injured spouse allocation using I.R.S.
Form 8379. The availability of injured spouse relief is described in the instructions 
to I.R.S. Form 1040; that said, the instructions for tax year 2014 were 104 pages 
long and the injured spouse option is mentioned in only one paragraph.  
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disadvantages described in this Article. He or she may have been 
economically better off filing jointly, even if a portion of the refund was 
applied to the other spouse’s debt (in some cases, he or she would be better 
off even if the entire refund was applied to the other spouse’s debt). 
B.  Three-Years Limitation 
As noted above, section 6013(b)(2)(A) prohibits a taxpayer from 
amending to file a joint return after the expiration of three years from the due 
date of the return in question if one of the spouses has filed a separate return. 
Accordingly, a spouse who files married filing separately,83 as in the two 
common scenarios I describe above, has a limited time in which to amend 
and file jointly. Thus in the nonfiler scenario, the nonfiler who comes into 
compliance late by more than three years will have no choice but to file as 
married filing separately for those years if his or her spouse filed a separate 
return. 
There is, however, disparate treatment among similarly situated 
taxpayers. Where both spouses are nonfilers, no such time restriction on 
filing jointly applies. The Service expects nonfilers to come into compliance 
for at least the most recent six tax years;84 if there has been an assessment 
based on a substitute return, it may be in the taxpayer’s interest to file returns 
for still older years if doing so will reduce the liability. In cases in which 
both spouses are nonfilers (including the case in which the working spouse 
was a nonfiler and the other spouse did not have a filing requirement), these 
couples benefit from the EITC to reduce (or even eliminate) the liability even 
when they are time barred from receiving any refund that would have been 
due.85 But in the cases in which one spouse was separately compliant, both 
83. As explained in section D of this Part, it is an unsettled question as to
whether a spouse who files single or head of household is subject to section 
6013(b)(2)(A). The Service takes the view that such a spouse would be subject to the 
three-year limitation. See infra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. However, a 
spouse who incorrectly files as single or head of household will receive the EITC to 
which he or she is entitled; thus, the dollar sums at stake for the nonfiler are 
generally less significant than if the filing spouse correctly used the married filing 
separately status. 
84. I.R.M. 4.12.1.3.
85. Though section 6511 provides a general three-year statute of
limitation for refund claims, a taxpayer can claim the credit to reduce the liability to 
zero even after the refund statute expiration date has passed. The Service does not 
dispute that a married couple can file jointly if more than three years from the due 
date has passed, so long as neither spouse has filed a return for that year. Rev. Rul. 
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spouses are time barred from the chance to amend to married filing jointly; 
thus they lose the chance to claim credits that would have reduced their 
income tax liability. For these families, the overall higher liability will also 
include higher accompanying penalties for failure to timely file and failure to 
pay.86 
While I do not advocate for an exception to the refund statute 
expiration rule, I do not like the disparate treatment currently resulting from 
section 6013(b)(2)(A). In the case of two nonfilers, they are allowed at any 
time later to file a joint return and reduce their liability by the amount of any 
credits that would have been due. But where only one taxpayer was a 
nonfiler and one filed a separate return, the couple cannot avail themselves of 
the benefit of a joint return once three years from the original due date have 
passed. This lack of symmetry results in a troubling inequity. 
Married taxpayers should be allowed to amend to file jointly without regard 
to a time limitation in cases in which one or both spouses previously filed 
separately and amending could reduce or eliminate an outstanding liability.87  
C.  Impact of Filing a Petition in U.S. Tax Court and the Recent Case Study 
of Isaak Ibrahim 
The other restriction in section 6013(b)(2) that is harmful to low-
income taxpayers is subsection (B), which prohibits the spouses from 
amending to a joint return after a Notice of Deficiency has been issued and 
one spouse files a petition in Tax Court. The likely scenario here is that the 
married taxpayers use an unscrupulous return preparer who files an incorrect 
return for one or both spouses using a filing status of single or head of 
household. Taxpayers with low levels of education and those with low 
72–539, 1972–2 C.B. 634. Prior to this revenue ruling, the Tax Court had held a 
taxpayer who has not yet filed any return was precluded from electing joint filing 
status once the three year statute of limitations had passed. Durovic v. 
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364 (1970), aff’d on this issue (but reversed in part), 487 
F.2d 36 (1973). Upon reconsideration of the issue after Rev. Rul. 72–539 was issued, 
the Tax Court declined to continue following Durovic on this point, and instead 
followed the more taxpayer-friendly Revenue Ruling. Following the decision, the 
Service acquiesced. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433, 441 (1986), action 
on dec. 1992–004 (Oct. 22, 1991). 
86. I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1)–(2). The penalties are calculated on the net
amount due. IRC § 6651(b). 
87. If this were permitted by the Code, I would also propose that upon the
filing of a joint return the statute of limitations on assessment (and thus on 
examination) be reset for the taxpayer who had previously filed a separate return. 
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English proficiency are especially vulnerable. It is well-documented that 
unregulated return preparers intentionally misrepresent filing status and other 
facts on tax returns to inflate refunds.88 The most vulnerable taxpayers may 
not be aware of these misrepresentations or the consequences thereof, having 
fully relied on the return preparer to fill out the return correctly.89 If the 
return is subsequently selected for a correspondence audit,90 the taxpayer 
may not understand or participate in the examination process.91 
A recent and significant example of such a scenario is documented in 
the Ibrahim v. Commissioner case.92 I discuss the broader statutory 
implications of Ibrahim in the next Section, because it is part of a line of 
cases illustrating how the definition of “separate return” is unsettled in the 
courts. But the facts in this case illustrate fittingly how section 6013(b)(2)(B) 
can be a trap for the unwary and are worthy of mention in detail here.93 
88. See WU, supra note 38; Michelle Lyon Drumbl, When Helpers Hurt:
Protecting Taxpayers from Preparers, 145 TAX NOTES 1365 (Dec. 22, 2014); Nina 
E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX 
NOTES 767 (May 13, 2013). 
89. See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who
Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and 
Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113 (2013). 
90. EITC returns are twice as likely to be audited as the average
individual income tax return. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANN. REP. TO 
CONGRESS vol. 1, at 300; Fiscal Outlook: Addressing Improper Payments and the 
Tax Gap Would Improve the Government’s Fiscal Position: Hearing Before S. 
Comm. on Budget, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller 
General of the United States) (also noting that “about 45 percent of correspondence 
audits (audits done by mail) that closed in fiscal year 2013 focused on EITC 
issues”). 
91. The Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a research study of “audit
barriers” to better understand EITC audit outcomes. Among the interesting findings, 
the study revealed that the letters used in correspondence audits were not clear to the 
recipients: more than 25% of the EITC taxpayers it surveyed “did not understand the 
[Service] was auditing their return”; 39% “did not understand what the [Service] was 
questioning about their EI[T]C claim”; and only 50% “felt they knew what they 
needed to do in response to the audit letter.” NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 
ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS vol. 2, at 103–04. 
92. 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050 (2014), rev’d, 788 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015).
93. Kathryn Sedo, whose low-income taxpayer clinic represented Mr.
Ibrahim before the Tax Court and the Eighth Circuit, calls section 6013(b)(2)(B) a 
“procedural trap.” Kathryn Sedo & Frank DiPietro, Ibrahim v. Comm’r: A 
Procedural Trap for Unrepresented Taxpayers, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 29, 
2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/ibrahim-v-commr-a-procedural-trap-for-
unrpresented-taxpayers/. 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   35 12/21/2016   6:16:44 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 429 




 The decisions and the briefs of the parties describe Mr. Ibrahim and 
his wife, Ms. Hassan, as refugee immigrants from Somalia who spoke 
limited to no English.94 The couple relied on the ODAY Tax Service for tax 
assistance in the tax year 2011.95 The preparers at ODAY spoke Somali, and 
Mr. Ibrahim asserts that he told the preparer his correct marital status, but the 
return was prepared incorrectly.96 The preparer completed a return for Mr. 
Ibrahim as “head of household” and a separate return for Ms. Hassan as 
“unmarried.”97 The couple was unaware of this inaccuracy; Mr. Ibrahim’s 
education was the equivalent of less than a high school diploma and the 
couple assumed that the professional tax service would prepare the tax 
returns accurately.98 
 Subsequent to filing, Mr. Ibrahim’s return was selected for 
examination. He was issued a Notice of Deficiency and filed a petition with 
the Tax Court. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Commissioner conceded 
that Mr. Ibrahim was entitled to the dependency exemptions and child tax 
credits that were claimed.99 With the benefit of counsel now assisting him, 
Mr. Ibrahim conceded that he was not entitled to head of household status. 
He and his wife wished to amend to use married filing joint status. However, 
the Commissioner argued that section 6013(b)(2)(B) applied to preclude their 
filing a joint return. The outcome and merits of that argument are discussed 
in detail in the next Section. As a practical matter for Mr. Ibrahim and Ms. 
Hassan, the application of section 6013(b)(2)(B) meant that they were denied 
the EITC they should have been entitled to, simply because they could not 
correct their return to file jointly. If Mr. Ibrahim had been allowed to amend, 
the couple would have received a refund of $5,151.100 
 Significantly, the Service examiner did not advise Mr. Ibrahim of 
section 6013(b)(2)(B). The Notice of Deficiency does not mention the Code 
section’s limitation. Had Mr. Ibrahim amended prior to filing a Tax Court 
                                                 
 94. The taxpayer’s brief states that they spoke no English. Brief for 
Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14–
2070) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. The government’s brief states that his 
“proficiency in English is very limited.” Brief for Appellee at 5, Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 
788 F.3d. 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14–2070) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
 95. Brief for Appellant, supra.note 94, at 6; Brief for Appellee, supra note 
94, at 6. 
 96. Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 6. 
 97. Id. at 6–7. 
 98. Id. at 7. 
 99. Id. at 1. 
 100. Id. at 9–10. 
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petition, he would not have been barred from changing to joint filing 
status,101 but he was not aware of this fact. 
Why would a tax return preparer knowingly prepare the returns this 
way? One can only speculate, but it is likely that the preparer did so to 
maximize the tax refund for the clients. Mr. Ibrahim and his wife claimed a 
total of three children on their separate returns; while the EITC allows a 
married couple credit for up to three qualifying children, the return preparer 
may have calculated that by splitting the children between two returns the 
couple would benefit from two refunds that were collectively higher than 
what they would have been entitled to on a joint return.102 Why would a 
return preparer seek to increase a refund beyond what the taxpayer is entitled 
to? Again, one can only speculate, but this practice is apparently widespread 
among certain types of return preparers.103 
Leslie Book argues that the structure of the EITC presents incentives for 
certain types of taxpayers to intentionally misstate eligibility and claim the 
credit.104 Though Book relies on different examples in making his argument, 
the income limitation on joint filers claiming EITC creates another such 
structural incentive: dual-earner married taxpayers filing jointly are subject 
to the EITC phase-out at a level that is far less than twice the income level 
for two unmarried individuals. Hence, there is an incentive for taxpayers (or 
101. Petitioner-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2–3, Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 
F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2070). 
102. As described in the Petitioner-Appellant’s brief, Mr. Ibrahim’s head of 
household return claimed only two children. Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 1. 
Ms. Hassan’s return is not before the court, but the details are described in the brief 
for the Appellee. According to the appellee, Ms. Hassan claimed one child on her 
unmarried return for the same tax year; when combined with her withholding and 
additional child tax credit, this resulted in an overpayment amount of $3,778. Brief 
for Appellee, supra note 94, at 7. I have no first-hand knowledge of this case, but I 
am drawing on experience with my own clients and I presume that the return 
preparer would not have filed the returns incorrectly unless it resulted in a larger 
refund for the couple collectively. According to Appellee’s brief, Ms. Hassan has 
four children. Mr. Ibrahim would be entitled to claim the stepchildren as dependents 
regardless of whether he filed as head of household or married. Id. at 6. Also 
according to Appellee’s brief, Mr. Ibrahim indicated in his pretrial memorandum that 
he wished to claim the fourth child. Id. at 9 n.5. It is not clear why neither spouse 
claimed the fourth child on the returns as originally filed. 
103. For detailed examples of unscrupulous behavior by paid preparers, see 
Brief for National Consumer Law Center & National Community Tax Coalition as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. Internal Revenue Serv., 
742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 13–5061). See also WU, supra note 38. 
104. Book, supra note 72, at 1171. 
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their unscrupulous preparers) to incorrectly represent themselves as 
unmarried on their return. Book argues that policymakers should consider the 
structural incentives to cheat “in fashioning responses to the EITC error 
rate.”105 In other words, removing such incentives may result in a lower rate 
of noncompliance. Two of the proposals set forth in Part V would remove 
the structural incentives in the context of filing status. 
D.  Unsettled Issue: What Is a “Separate Return” for Purposes of Section 
6013(b)? 
The limitations of section 6013(b)(2) apply when a taxpayer who 
could have filed a joint return has instead filed “a separate return.” For this 
purpose, however, “separate return” is not defined in the Code. Should it be 
read to mean any return other than a joint return (including an erroneously 
filed “single” or “head of household” return), or does it only apply to a 
“married filing separately” return? There is no consensus on this issue. 
The Tax Court has consistently interpreted “separate return” to 
include a married taxpayer who files a return using any status other than 
married filing jointly.106 The alternative interpretation gained traction in 
Glaze v. United States, a refund case in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
U.S. District Court in interpreting “separate return” for the purpose of 
6013(b)(1) to mean specifically a married taxpayer who previously elected to 
file using the married filing separately status.107 
The facts in Glaze were somewhat unusual in that the return in 
question was filed posthumously by the estate’s administrator, who was 
awaiting a jury determination as to whether the taxpayer was married at the 
time of his death. Thus, the administrator could not elect between married 
filing jointly or separately at the time of filing; he filed as single and 
subsequently needed to change the status because the jury determined that 
the taxpayer, in fact, had been married.108 
105. Id. at 1185. 
106. Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014) (citing 
Currie v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 486 (1986); Blumenthal v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 590 (1983); Saniewski v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1979)). 
107. Glaze v. United States, 641 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981). 
108. The opinion, in searching for the legislative intent, emphasizes that the 
estate administrator in Glaze did not make an affirmative election: 
It is clear that Section 6013 was enacted as a matter of legislative grace 
to permit married taxpayers to escape the adverse financial consequences 
resulting from an injudicious election to initially file separate returns 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   38 12/21/2016   6:16:44 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 432 




 Despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Glaze, the Service and its 
Office of Chief Counsel since have consistently taken the position that any 
return other than a joint return is a “separate return” for purposes of section 
6013(b)(1).109 Relying on advice from Chief Counsel, the Commissioner 
argues that Congress could not have intended the term “separate return” to 
refer to the status of married filing separately because that rate schedule had 
not yet been created when the predecessor section to 6013(b)(1) was 
enacted.110 
 Since Glaze, the Tax Court has continued to side with the 
Commissioner on this issue, consistently adopting this same interpretation 
outside of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.111 In the recent 
case of Ibrahim v. Commissioner, the facts of which are described supra,112 
the Tax Court again sided with the Commissioner, stating that it would 
follow its prior precedent and decline to follow Glaze because it is was not 
                                                                                                                   
rather than a single joint return…. It is clear that Section 6013 was never 
intended to cover situations such as the one presented here where a 
taxpayer erroneously lists his status as single rather than married…It 
would be absurd to advance the proposition that in enacting Section 
6013(b)(1), (2) Congress had in mind the unusual factual circumstances 
of this case. 
 
Glaze, 641 F.2d. at 342, 344. 
 109. As such, the Service’s published guidance adopts this interpretation. 
For example, Publication 501 states: “a separate return includes a return filed by you 
or your spouse claiming married filing separately, single, or head of household filing 
status.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 1, at 8. 
 110. C.C.N. CC–2006–010, 2006 WL 587325 (Mar. 2, 2006) (noting that 
the predecessor section to 6013(b)(1) was enacted in 1951, whereas the married 
filing separately rate schedule was not created until 1969). See also Rev. Rul. 83–
183, 1983–2 C.B. 220; A.O.D. 1981–140 (June 2, 1981). 
 111. See, e.g., Swonder v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 579 (1994); 
Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433 (1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
issue, 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 590 (1983). The Tax Court is not bound to follow Glaze outside of the 
circuits in which the decision is precedential. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 
757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Glaze is precedential in both the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because the Eleventh Circuit adopted all Fifth Circuit 
precedent subsequent to Glaze. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 
1981). Accordingly, Chief Counsel instructed its attorneys to challenge Glaze in all 
circuits other than the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. C.C.N. CC–2006–010. 
 112. Supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
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controlling in a case to which appeal would lie in the Eighth Circuit.113 As it 
has in the past, the Tax Court supported its decision with the rationale of 
timing in its statutory interpretation, noting “the fact that Congress enacted 
the predecessor statute to section 6013(b) in 1951 but did not establish a 
separate rate structure for married taxpayers filing separately until 1969.”114 
Mr. Ibrahim appealed his case to the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth 
Circuit reversed the Tax Court. The court rejected the Commissioner’s 
argument that “separate return” cannot mean “married filing separately” 
because that filing status did not exist at the time the predecessor statute to 
6013 was enacted: 
The Commissioner is incorrect. Form 1040 for 1951 lists 
“married person filing separately” in its tax table (with the 
same rate as single taxpayers). The 1952 tax-form 
instructions—interpreting the 1951 Act—repeatedly use 
“separate returns” and allow only married taxpayers to file a 
“separate return,” with different directions for head-of-
household taxpayers. Even in 1952, “separate return” did 
not apply to those filing as head of household.115 
Indeed, the Commissioner was incorrect. Married taxpayers had the option 
to file a separate return long before 1951. In fact, the concept of a married 
person filing a separate return predates the concept of a joint return.116 
Married taxpayers were not given the option to report income on a joint 
113. Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014). 
114. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803(a), 83 
Stat. 487, 676). 
115. Ibrahim v. Comm’r, 788 F.3d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations 
omitted). The Commissioner made this argument in its appeals brief: 
[W]hen the first predecessor of Section 6013(b) was enacted in 1951, 
the filing status of ‘married, filing separately,’ did not even exist. It 
was enacted only in 1969. Congress obviously could not have meant 
‘separate return’ to be limited to a filing status that would not be 
created for many years to come. 
Brief for Appellee, supra note 94, at 15. 
116. For a history of the origins of the joint return and the subsequent 
introduction of joint liability, see Richard C. E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: 
Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 
317 (1990). See also Drumbl, supra note 17. 
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return until 1918, five years after the enactment of the modern income tax 
code.117 
It is true that in 1951 there was not yet a separate rate structure 
designated as “married filing separately” and correct that the rate structure 
for that status was not created until 1969. The Service Chief Counsel made 
this point in its prior published guidance to the Commissioner,118 and the 
Tax Court adopted this rationale in interpreting “separate return” to mean 
any return not filed jointly.119 However, this argument fails to appreciate the 
historical context in which section 51(g) (current section 6013) was enacted. 
In 1951, a joint return was by far the most favorable option available to 
taxpayers. A couple who did not elect to file jointly was forsaking income 
splitting, an option that was relatively new and not available to unmarried 
taxpayers. Taken in this context, it makes sense that the oft-cited legislative 
history—“[a]s a proper election frequently requires informed tax knowledge 
not possessed by the average person, the binding election[] … may result in 
substantially excessive taxes”120— referred to married couples reducing their 
total tax liability through income splitting. In enacting section 51(g), 
Congress wanted to add flexibility to taxpayers who could have elected to 
file a joint return but did not do so—meaning only those who were married 
but filed a separate return. 
To better appreciate this context, a review of the evolution of the 
filing statuses and rate brackets is instructive. 
From 1918 until 1948, the applicable tax rates were the same for all 
types of filers, with the result that a married couple who chose to aggregate 
income on a joint return could be pushed into a higher tax bracket, which 
meant the couple incurred a higher liability than if they had filed as two 
individuals. Apart from the convenience of filling out only one form, the 
benefit of joint filing occurred only in a scenario in which one spouse had 
deductions or credits that could offset the income of the other spouse.121 
117. See Beck, supra note 116, at 335. 
118. See C.C.N. CC–2006–010, 2006 WL 587325 (Mar. 2, 2006); see also 
Rev. Rul. 83–183, 1983–2 C.B. 220. 
119. Ibrahim v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1052 (2014). 
120. S. REP. NO. 82-781, at 48 (1951). 
121. See Grant v. Rose, 24 F.2d 115, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1928) 
(summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of a married couple filing jointly), 
aff'd, 39 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1930); see also Beck, supra note 116, at 337 n.78 (citing 
legislative history (H.R. REP. NO. 77-1040) showing that, in 1938, when it was rarely 
the case that a couple would benefit economically by filing jointly, 94% of married 
couples filed a joint return). Beck points out that federal income tax rates were low 
enough in 1938 that it made no difference in most people's tax rates whether they 
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Separate rate brackets for married filing jointly were introduced in 1948. 
Married taxpayers filing separately could not use these new brackets and 
instead were subject to the rate brackets applicable to unmarried 
taxpayers.122 These new separate brackets benefitted all married taxpayers 
who filed jointly versus their unmarried peers and couples who filed 
separately, because the married filing jointly brackets were exactly twice as 
wide as the rate schedule for unmarried taxpayers. This allowed “income 
splitting” between married couples123 and was the introduction of what we 
now call the “marriage bonus” for those who file jointly.124 As is true today, 
in 1948 the most dramatic example of the marriage bonus existed in a one-
income family: if the husband filed a separate return, he would have been 
subject to the narrower unmarried income bracket, but if he filed a joint 
return with his spouse who had no income, he was subject to an income 
bracket twice as wide. This meant his rate of taxation would likely be lower 
if he filed jointly. These differences were particularly pronounced in 1948 
because the structure was steeply progressive. There were a total of 24 
different rates applied to taxable income of individuals, and the marginal 
rates ranged from 20% to 91%.125 
filed jointly or separately; he posits that most of these couples filed jointly for the 
sake of the convenience of filling out one form rather than two, rather than to 
achieve tax savings. Id. 
122. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948). 
123. Between 1930 and 1948, married taxpayers in the nine community 
property states already enjoyed the advantage of “income splitting” because each 
individual was subject to tax on one-half of the couple’s total income. The Revenue 
Act of 1948 created the wider bracket for married taxpayers in order to address the 
disparity between common property states and community property states. See S. 
REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184–1187 
(Westlaw). 
124. For a historical examination of marriage bonuses and penalties, see 
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something about Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000). Zelenak notes that while the 1948 legislation 
achieved couples neutrality, its purpose was “a delayed response to geographic 
discrimination between husbands in separate property states and those in community 
property states.” Id. at 4. Zelenak notes, as others have, that the goals of 
progressivity, couples neutrality, and marriage neutrality are incompatible. Id. at 6. 
125. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Nominal Dollars, 
Income Years 1913-2013, TAX FOUNDATION, http://taxfoundation.org/sites/ 
taxfoundation.org/files/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2016). The effective rates, after statutory reductions, ranged from 16.6 to 
82.13%. SOI Tax Stats—Historical Table 23, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-23 (last updated May 17, 
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With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1951, at the same time 
51(g) was introduced, the head of household status and accompanying rate 
schedule was created. The purpose of this new filing status was “to grant 
partial income splitting benefits to widows, widowers, and single persons 
with dependents in their households.”126 The rate schedule for head of 
household taxpayers was designed such that, at any income level, a taxpayer 
filing as head of household would have an income tax liability “about 
halfway between the tax paid by a married couple filing a joint return and a 
single individual.”127 
Over the next two decades, the sizable marriage bonus came to be 
viewed by many as too unfair to unmarried taxpayers. Critics pointed out 
that an unmarried person’s tax was as much as 42% higher than the tax paid 
by a married couple filing jointly reporting the same total income as the 
unmarried person.128 To address this inequity, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
introduced a lower rate structure for unmarried individuals, which was 
separate from the rate structure applicable to married individuals filing 
jointly or separately and also to head of household. The 1969 Act reduced 
the rate structure only with respect to unmarried persons; it left intact the 
prior rate structure with respect to married persons filing separately. 
Congress did not want to leave a rate loophole for married taxpayers: 
The prior law single person rate schedule was retained for 
married persons filing separate returns because if each 
spouse were permitted to use the new tax rate schedule for 
single persons, many (especially those in community 
property states) could arrange their affairs and income in 
such a way that their combined tax would be less than that 
on a joint return.129 
Hence, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 created the rate brackets particular to 
today’s filing statuses—not the filing statuses themselves. It also provided 
2016) (consisting of data for “U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions and 
Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 
1913–2015”). 
126. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 91ST CONG., 
JCS-16-70, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 222 
(1970) [hereinafter JCT, 1969 ACT]. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 223. 
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relief to unmarried taxpayers, which reduced the significance of the 
marriage bonus available to those who filed jointly. 
Though I agree with the Eighth Circuit, reasonable legal minds can differ 
as to the correct statutory interpretation of “separate return” within the 
meaning of the Code as a whole. If the Service continues to advance its view 
in Tax Court cases outside of the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, then 
perhaps a circuit split will develop as to the interpretation. 
In the meantime, the Eighth Circuit’s Ibrahim decision is an important 
precedent for low-income taxpayers who improperly use the filing status of 
single or head of household (whether knowingly or not) or rely on an 
unscrupulous return preparer who does so on their behalf. What is the size of 
the population impacted by the interpretation of “separate return”? The most 
recent Service report estimating EITC compliance notes that among all EITC 
claimants, two percent of those filing as single and nine percent of those 
filing as head of household are estimated to have the correct status of married 
filing separately.130 The report further notes that approximately one-fifth of 
the taxpayers audited for EITC noncompliance due to filing status errors 
“chose to change their filing status to married-filing-jointly as part of the 
resolution of the audit rather than maintain two married-filing-separately 
returns.”131 If the Service and Tax Court were to accept the Eighth Circuit’s 
interpretation, these categories of taxpayers would be allowed to change to 
filing jointly regardless of whether a Tax Court petition had been filed. 
IV. WHY A SPECIAL STATUS FOR MARRIED COUPLES?
A.  A Very Brief History of Why the Joint Filing Status Exists 
Much has been written about the how and why the Code allows 
married taxpayers to file jointly.132 Though joint filing was originally 
introduced as an administrative convenience to married taxpayers, the 
current system evolved over many decades from a framework in which those 
taxpayers who lived in community property states were permitted a tax 
treatment that was not available to taxpayers who lived in the common law 
states.133 Following the Supreme Court’s Poe v. Seaborn decision,134 
130. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 20. 
131. Id. at 20 n.43. 
132. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 116; Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income 
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975); Zelenak, supra note 124. 
133. See Beck, supra note 116; Bittker, supra note 132. 
134. 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930). 
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Congress recognized that it would be problematic not to allow married 
couples in all states the option to report income on a joint return.135 Because 
those distinctions among states still exist today, the rationale for a married 
filing jointly rate bracket still exists. 
As other scholars have on a variety of policy grounds,136 I have 
argued elsewhere in favor of moving to a system of individual filing for all 
taxpayers regardless of marital status.137 In this Article, however, I accept 
that Congress is unlikely to abolish the option of a joint return. Under that 
premise, my concern is to propose solutions to mitigate the inequities faced 
by those who are “considered as married” but cannot avail themselves of the 
benefits of joint filing, whether it is because joint filing is not an option or 
because section 6013 limits their ability to file a joint return subsequent to a 
non-joint one. 
135 In addition to recognizing the need for consistent treatment of married couples 
across community property and common law states, the legislative history to the 
Revenue Act of 1948 notes that providing a different rate schedule for married 
couples would simplify administration in other ways: 
The incentive for married couples in common-law states to 
attempt the reduction of their taxes by the division of their income 
through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and family 
partnerships will be reduced materially. Administrative 
difficulties stemming from the use of such devices will be 
diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation 
on the income tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships. 
S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 
1187 (Westlaw). 
136. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single 
Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 684 (2010) (arguing that 
the joint return should be abolished because it penalizes single people). See also 
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–23 (1997) (advocating individual 
filing as more beneficial for women); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the 
IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 
63, 108–10 (1993) (arguing that individual tax returns would be more equitable); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 395–96 
(1994) (concluding that mandatory separate returns present the best option among 
imperfect neutralities). 
137. Drumbl, supra note 17. 
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B.  A Brief Word About Marriage Penalties and Disincentives 
While it is well documented that married couples enjoy a number of 
tax benefits by virtue of their marital status, it is also the case that for many 
couples there are tax disadvantages to being married, even when they file a 
joint return.138 Since 1969 when the unmarried brackets were adjusted 
downwards, couples with two incomes have often found themselves subject 
to a higher tax liability relative to what their liability would be as two 
unmarried persons. 
It is not just high earners who face a marriage penalty. Low-income, 
unmarried taxpayers raising children in one household can structure their 
filing status, dependency exemptions, and claim for the EITC so as to receive 
significantly higher benefits than a similarly situated married couple would 
receive.139 
And it is not just the rate brackets that sometimes favor unmarried 
taxpayers. The Ninth Circuit recently held that dollar limitations on the 
deductibility of mortgage interest apply per taxpayer, not per residence, with 
the result that an unmarried couple can collectively deduct twice as much 
mortgage interest as that allowed to a married couple.140 In its opinion, the 
court acknowledged that this interpretation creates a “marriage penalty.”141 
Congress has acted in the past to address and reduce the marriage penalty, 
notably in 2001 when it increased the standard deduction for joint filers and 
also widened the 10 and 15% rate brackets for married filing jointly to twice 
that of unmarried persons.142 In an earlier bill that passed the House but not 
the Senate, the House Committee on Ways and Means acknowledged “the 
138. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal 
Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards 
a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006); Theodore P. Seto, 
The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 
(2008). 
139. See Drumbl, supra note 17, at 127–33. 
140. Voss v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
the Code section 163(h)(3) limitations on the deductibility of mortgage interest are 
applied on a per-taxpayer basis rather than on a per-residence basis), rev’g 138 T.C. 
8 (2012); Kathleen Pender, Tax Ruling a Win for Unmarried People Who Own a 
Home Together, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/
networth/article/Tax-ruling-a.-win-for-unmarried-people-who-own-a-6436357.php. 
141. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1065. 
142. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, §§ 301–02, 115 Stat. 38, 53 (2001). 
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inequity that arises when two working single individuals marry and 
experience a tax increase solely by reason of their marriage,”143 but the report 
also notes that there is no solution that will please all constituents: 
 
Any attempt to address the marriage tax penalty involves 
the balancing of several competing principles, including 
equal tax treatment of married couples with equal incomes, 
the determination of equitable relative tax burdens of 
single individuals and married couples with equal incomes, 
and the goal of simplicity in compliance and 
administration.144 
 
Indeed, there is no way Congress can solve this conundrum; as the Second 
Circuit wrote when it affirmed the Tax Court’s rejection of a married 
couple’s constitutional challenge to the marriage penalty: “it is simply 
impossible to design a progressive tax regime in which all married couples of 
equal aggregate income are taxed equally and in which an individual's tax 
liability is unaffected by changes in marital status.”145 
 Accepting that no system can result in equal treatment of all 
taxpayers and that mandated individual filing would create new inequities to 
which some groups would object, I instead propose three alternative reforms 
that would address the concerns I have about low-income taxpayers who are 
married but cannot viably elect to file a joint return. 
 
V. THREE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD ALLOW LESS PUNITIVE SEPARATE 
FILING FOR MARRIED TAXPAYERS 
 
 Parts II and III of this Article outline some of the ways in which the 
married filing separately option is punitive for low-income couples. Part IV 
                                                 
 143. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 6 (2001). This House bill (H.R. 6, 107th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2001)) did not pass the Senate, but parts of the bill were 
incorporated into H.R. 1836, which was enacted into law as Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P. L. No. 107–16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). 
 144. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 6 (2001). 
 145. Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (1982) (citing Bittker, supra note 
132, and quoting, “No algebraic equation, no matter how sophisticated, can solve 
this dilemma. Both ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same time.” Tax Treatment 
of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Working: Hearings 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on 
Taxation, 92d Cong. 78–79 (1972) (Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy)). See also Zelenak, supra note 136. 
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provides a very brief historical context of joint filing and a summary of the 
marriage penalty. 
This Part will set forth three proposals to improve upon the current 
system by providing alternatives that incentivize correct filing without 
stripping separate married filers of the benefits to which joint filers and 
unmarried filers are entitled. 
What each proposal has in common is simple: taxpayers should not 
be precluded from claiming EITC or other credits and deductions solely 
because of filing status. The Code can do a better job of determining 
eligibility and accommodating the nuances of relationships and economic 
partnerships. 
A.  Extend the Premium Tax Credit Exception to Other Types of Credits and 
Deductions 
The first and most modest alternative I propose would likely be the 
least costly and the smallest in scope. It builds on the exception provided for 
the premium tax credit: allow married taxpayers filing separately to claim the 
EITC (as well as any other credits or deductions otherwise denied to married 
filing separately filers) if they certify that they live apart from their spouse 
and are victims of spousal abuse or abandonment.146 Because this exception 
already exists in a temporary Treasury regulation, the Service has an 
established procedure for claiming the exception and has developed a list of 
acceptable supporting criteria. The “relief” box currently shown on I.R.S. 
Form 8962 could be moved to page 1 of the I.R.S. Form 1040 next to the box 
for filing status, and it could be used for the purpose of claiming relief for all 
credits and deductions rather than for just the premium tax credit.147 
146. Fred Brown and Mary Leto Pareja have made similar 
recommendations. See Fred Brown, Permitting Abused Spouses to Claim the Earned 
Income Tax Credit in Separate Returns, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 453 
(2016); Pareja, supra note 35, at 282 (“The principles behind allowing a Premium 
Tax Credit to individuals who are unable to file jointly due to domestic abuse or 
spousal abandonment apply equally to other tax credits, like the EITC, the adoption 
credit, and educational credits.”). 
147. Some organizations expressed a concern about the privacy 
implications of the relief box, given that tax returns are sometimes used for mortgage 
applications and other credit determinations. See, e.g., Letter from the National 
Health Law Program to the Internal Revenue Service 2 (October 27, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0006 (placing the relief 
box on page 1 of Form 1040 would simplify the procedure for taxpayers, but most 
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 Because these individuals live apart from their spouse and are 
unlikely to receive any financial support, there is no economic rationale for 
denying the credits—these are not taxpayers making a filing decision based 
on the largest available refund. The taxpayers who fit within this exception 
for relief are among the most financially vulnerable of all taxpayers—they 
are individuals in transition, starting a life without the spouse they had 
partnered with because their relationship deteriorated into a cruel ending. Of 
all the taxpayers who should not be penalized for filing a separate return, 
these generally will be the most sympathetic cases. 
 In response to the issuance of the premium tax credit temporary 
regulations promulgated in July 2014, commenters on behalf of more than a 
dozen different organizations submitted comments to Treasury. Most of 
these letters begin by commending the Treasury and Service for recognizing 
and addressing the situation these abused or abandoned spouses face, then 
proceed to make specific suggestions as to how the Treasury and Service 
might go farther to protect these taxpayers.148 For example, several 
commenters suggest rescinding the three-year limit on claiming the 
exception, arguing that this may be an insufficient time during which to 
obtain a divorce in these circumstances.149 
 This proposal is more ambitious in scope than what the commenters 
proposed. Taxpayers who certify that they live apart from their spouse and 
are victims of spousal abuse or abandonment should be entitled to claim the 
EITC and other credits and deductions now denied to separate filers. In a 
similar vein and because of the compelling economic reasons, I propose they 
should be entitled to claim the standard deduction regardless of whether their 
spouse itemized on his or her return.  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
certainly exacerbates the privacy concern. For that reason, thought should be given 
to indicating relief on a separate schedule that accompanies Form 1040.). 
 148. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Cong. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October 24, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0004; Letter from 
EverThrive Ill. to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October 27, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0017; and Letter from 
the N.M. Coal. of Sexual Assault Programs to the Internal Revenue Serv. (October 
27, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2014-0025-0005. 
 149. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Cong. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, supra note 148, at 3–4 (noting that “on average, a woman leaves an 
abusive partner seven to eight times before she is able to leave the relationship 
permanently”). 
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1. Pros of This Proposal
The primary advantage of this proposal is that it builds upon ideas 
that are implemented in existing regulations and procedures. In addition, the 
population it would reach is especially vulnerable and sympathetic, making it 
a change that is easy to justify from a policy standpoint. 
2. Cons of This Proposal
This proposal has two significant shortcomings, in my view. 
First, it is too modest. While I certainly favor relief for these 
sympathetic filers, I also believe relief should be extended more broadly (as I 
envision in my next two proposals). 
Second, this proposal would require expanding the exception to all 
filers, not just premium tax credit claimants. The premium tax credit is 
available only to those taxpayers with an annual income of between 100 and 
400% of the federal poverty line.150 For a one-person household in 2014, this 
meant an annual income between $11,670 and $46,680.151 Additionally, the 
taxpayer cannot claim the premium tax credit if he or she is eligible for 
Medicaid, Medicare, or an employer-provided plan.152 One report estimates 
that “more than 4.2 million households…are likely to qualify for both the 
EITC and premium credit.”153 An estimated 28 million tax returns claim the 
EITC.154 Thus, perhaps only 15% of total returns claiming EITC would also 
be claiming the premium tax credit. 
I fear that allowing more tax benefits through this procedure would 
have the perverse effect of bringing down greater scrutiny upon the taxpayers 
who check the “relief” box. This is a difficult subject matter for the Service 
150. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A). 
151. 79 Fed. Reg. 3,593 (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Jan. 22, 
2014) (poverty guideline for D.C. and 48 contiguous states). 
152.  I.R.C. §§ 36B(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f). 
153. Elizabeth Kneebone, Jane R. Williams & Natalie Holmes, Connecting 
EITC filers to the Affordable Care Act Premium Tax Credit, BROOKINGS INST., Mar. 
18, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/03/eitc-filers-affordable-
care-act-tax-credit-kneebone-williams-holmes. The 4.2 million figure relates to “tax 
returns,” or tax returns filed. The authors note that this figure represents 
approximately 7.5 million people. Id. 
154. SOI Tax Stats—Historical Table 1, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-1 (last updated Oct. 5, 2015) 
(consisting of data for “Individual Income Tax Returns: Selected Income and Tax 
Items for Tax Years 1999–2013”). 
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to audit, with the same sensitivities and evidentiary complexities that make 
innocent spouse relief determinations so time (and resource) consuming.155 
In a world in which only the premium tax credit is at stake, perhaps the 
Service may be more likely to take taxpayers at their word when they certify 
they meet the criteria for relief. 
 This proposal, though not my favored solution, would be better than 
the status quo. It also would be the easiest proposal to implement because the 
Service and Treasury have already developed a framework for the necessary 
administrative procedures to claim such an exception. 
 
B.  The Canadian Case Study: Credits and Deductions Should Be 
Determined Based on a Couple’s Household Income, Not on Marital Status 
 
 This proposal draws upon certain features of the Canadian income 
tax filing system. It suggests an approach to more appropriately allocate 
credits across households, particularly child-based credits. It proposes that 
the Code should not deny credits to a married taxpayer living apart from his 
or her spouse, but instead allocate those credits per separate household as if 
the taxpayers were unmarried. In tandem with this, it takes the idea of 
household income a step further in order to address the current inequitable 
practice of allowing unmarried but cohabitating parents to split multiple 
children among them and both benefit from the EITC at income levels that 
would not permit the same result if they were married filing jointly. Both 
ideas constitute a significant departure from our current system but together 
would result in a more equitable policy vis-à-vis households with children. 
 
   1.  Characteristics of the Canadian System 
 
 In Canada, as is the case in many other countries, returns are filed by 
individuals—there is no option for a joint return for married taxpayers. The 
base for computing individual tax liability is individual income, not 
combined family income. 
 However, combined family income is used to determine eligibility 
for certain purposes, such as the Canada Child Tax Benefit.156 For the 
                                                 
 155. For a discussion of the sensitivities and complexities of innocent 
spouse relief determinations, see Drumbl, supra note 17, at 114–119 (Part III.B). 
 156. For a helpful overview of the various ways in which marital or family 
status is relevant in the Canadian income tax system despite its use of an individual 
filing system, see Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal 
for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605 (2010). 
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purpose of determining this tax-free monthly benefit, which is administered 
by the Canada Revenue Agency, family income is defined to include that of 
the taxpayer’s “cohabiting spouse or common-law partner,” defined as: 
the person who at that time is the individual’s spouse or 
common-law partner and who is not at that time living 
separate and apart from the individual and, for the purpose 
of this definition, a person shall not be considered to be 
living separate and apart from an individual at any time 
unless they were living separate and apart at that time, 
because of a breakdown of their marriage or common-law 
partnership, for a period of at least 90 days that includes that 
time157 
The Canada Income Tax Act defines “common-law partner” as follows: 
a person who cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship 
with the taxpayer and  
(a) has so cohabited throughout the 12-month period that 
ends at that time, or 
(b) would be the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is a 
parent . . .  
and, for the purpose of this definition, where at any time the 
taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, 
they are, at any particular time after that time, deemed to be 
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were living 
separate and apart at the particular time for a period of at 
least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a 
breakdown of their conjugal relationship158 
157. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.). 
158. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 248 (Can.) (emphasis 
added). See also Hendricken v. The Queen, 2008 T.C.C. 48, 2008 Can. Tax Ct. 
LEXIS 76, at *8-9 (listing factors to be considered in determining whether taxpayers 
were in a “conjugal relationship”); Jamie Golombek, The Tax Costs of Shacking Up, 
FIN. POST (Oct. 8, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/personal-
finance/the-tax-costs-of-shacking-up; Brad Taylor, Married vs. Common Law—
What’s the Difference Anyway?, LAW NOW, (Mar. 8, 2015), 
http://www.lawnow.org/married-vs-common-law-whats-the-difference/ 
(summarizing the distinction for tax purposes and noting that this definition of 
“common-law partner” is specific to the federal income tax act and is different than 
the meaning for family law purposes in Canada). 
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Under these definitions, “family income” tracks beyond that which the 
United States captures in relying on legal marital status. It encompasses the 
combined income of unmarried taxpayers living together in a relationship for 
more than a year, as well as unmarried couples who have a child or children 
together, regardless of the length of time of cohabitation.159 In order for a 
taxpayer to receive the Canada Child Tax Benefit, both the taxpayer and his 
or her cohabitating spouse or common-law partner must file an individual 
income tax return, even if one is not otherwise required to do so.160 The 
taxpayer is required to enter the spouse or partner’s social insurance number, 
name, and net income in order to claim the benefit.161 
In spite of its mandated individual filing system, it should be noted 
that there are certain tax advantages in Canada to being married or having a 
common-law partner.162 One recent example of this is the introduction of 
income splitting, which gained steam particularly among proponents in the 
Conservative party during the time Steven Harper was Prime Minister. In 
2007, Canada adopted income splitting for pension income.163 In 2014, 
Canada enacted a federal “Family Tax Cut,” which allowed a higher-income 
spouse/common-law partner to notionally transfer income to a 
spouse/common-law partner in a lower tax bracket if the couple has children 
under the age of 18.164 Critics of the income-splitting measures charge that it 
159. The cross-references in subparagraph (b) of the Canada Income Tax 
Act section 248(1) definition of common-law marriage serve to narrow the definition 
of “parent” by excluding children of the common-law partner who are not the 
taxpayer’s children and excluding what would be in-law relationships. R.S.C. 1985, 
c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 248(1) (Can.) Thus, a taxpayer who cohabitates in a conjugal
relationship for less than 12 months and is not the parent of a child by that 
relationship is not a “common-law partner” for purposes of the Canada Income Tax 
Act. 
160. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.61 (Can.). 
161. See Canada Revenue Agency, Form 5000-R T1 General 2015, at 1, 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pbg/tf/5000-r/README.html. 
162. Some of these policies might be rolled back or eliminated following 
the November 2015 election, as the Liberal party ran on a platform that proposed to 
eliminate income splitting (but not pension splitting) and replace the Canada Child 
Tax Benefit with a Canada Child Benefit. See JUSTIN TRUDEAU’S PLAN FOR 
FAIRNESS FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS, https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/05/Fairness-
for-the-Middle-Class.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
163. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 56(1)(a.2), s. 60(c), 
s. 60.03, s. 220(3.201) (Can.).
164. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 119.1 (Can.); see also 
TIM SCHOLZ & TREVOR SHAW, OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICER, 
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disproportionately benefits wealthier families165 or that it provides the least 
benefit to low-income families.166 
2. My Proposal—Calculate Credits on Household Income Based on
Residence, Not Strictly on Marital Status 
The United States could switch to a model built upon this Canadian 
approach. Under this proposal, Congress would retain the current filing 
statuses and brackets, keeping intact any benefits of income splitting for 
married taxpayers who file jointly and the less favorable brackets for married 
filing separately that apply at higher income levels. But instead of a blanket 
denial of credits to married taxpayers who file separate returns, I propose that 
income eligibility be determined based on whether the taxpayers live 
together or live, in the words of the Canada Income Tax Act, “separate and 
apart.” This would replace (or at a minimum could supplement) the Code’s 
current determination of whether a taxpayer is “considered as married,”167 
which in my view is far too restrictive for couples who part ways and take up 
separate residences. 
I am in favor of a using a measurement more favorable to separated 
couples than what is currently permitted for the “considered as married” rule. 
Under current section 7703, a taxpayer must live apart for at least the last six 
months of the taxable year to “not be considered as married.” This is too 
punitive a measurement, in my view, for couples who are newly separated. 
Recall also that if there are no qualifying children, the taxpayers who live 
apart the entire year but who are not yet “legally separated from his spouse 
THE FAMILY TAX CUT, (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/ 
Family_Tax_Cut_EN.pdf. 
165. DAVID MACDONALD, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, 
INCOME SPLITTING IN CANADA: INEQUALITY BY DESIGN 20–21 (2014), 
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%
20Office/2014/01/Income_Splitting_in_Canada.pdf (calling income splitting “a tax 
loophole big enough to drive a Rolls Royce through” and stating that “[t]he richer 
the family, the more it stands to gain; the poorer the family, the more it stands to 
lose”). 
166. John Geddes, The Surprising Spoils of Income-Splitting: We’ve Got 
New Numbers on Who Gets How Much, MACLEAN’S (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/new-numbers-on-who-wins-from-income-
splitting/. 
167. I.R.C. § 7703; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance” will still be 
“considered as married” for tax filing status purposes.168 
 I prefer Canada’s approach of using a 90-day period as a measure of 
whether taxpayers are living “separate and apart” from one another. Thus, I 
propose that taxpayers who have moved out of the marital home due to a 
break of at least 90 days in the relationship but who are not yet legally 
separated be given more flexibility. They still would have the option to file a 
joint return (assuming an amicable split) or as married filing separately, just 
as they do now. Unlike under the current Code, though, my proposal would 
not automatically deny certain credits to separate filers. Instead, these 
separate filers would have the option to self-designate as a “separate and 
apart” household, with the result that their eligibility would be calculated 
based upon household income. In other words, a low-income taxpayer who 
separates from her spouse for a period of at least 90 days would be eligible 
for the EITC and the rules would apply as if she were unmarried. At the 
same time, a higher-income taxpayer who separates would face the EITC 
income phase-out as if she were unmarried. 
 Ninety days—approximately three months of living apart—is a long 
enough period to measure whether a couple is having serious relationship 
difficulty. After such a period, the couple is likely to have diverging financial 
interests because they are maintaining separate households. Congress should 
exclude from the 90-day measure any periods of temporary absence such as 
attending school away, being apart for work or health reasons, or 
incarceration.169 For tax purposes, the Canada Income Tax Act measures the 
90 days not as physical absence but time apart “because of a breakdown of 
their marriage or common-law partnership.”170 
Under this proposal, I would allow taxpayers who are living apart as of 
December 31 to use a 90-day rule that spans two tax years (as opposed to 
rigidly measuring the last 90 days of the tax year). Thus, if a married couple 
splits up on December 15, Year 1 and remains apart (living in separate 
residences, not because of a temporary absence) as of March 15, Year 2, the 
taxpayers would be considered to be “separate and apart” as of the end of 
Year 1 for filing purposes. After all, relationships and life decisions do not 
neatly follow a calendar-year schedule. In terms of economic impact, this 
                                                 
 168. I.R.C. § 7703. 
 169. Currently, the Code does exclude similar temporary absences from its 
determination of marital status with respect to the principal place of abode of the 
taxpayer (note however, that the Treasury Regulations do not include incarceration 
in its list of situations that constitute a “temporary absence due to special 
circumstances”). Reg. § 1.7703–1(b)(3). 
 170. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.). 
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would be no less arbitrary a rule than allowing taxpayers who wed on 
December 31 to file a joint return or than allowing taxpayers to claim as a 
qualifying child in Year One a baby who is born on December 31, Year 
One.171 In terms of administrative convenience and certainty, taxpayers 
invoking the separate-and-apart rule will know whether they have satisfied 
the 90-day requirement in advance of the April 15 return filing deadline even 
if the split occurred at the very end of the tax year. 
In addition to easing the rule for spouses who separate, my proposal 
would also move the U.S. system one important and different step further 
toward treating similarly situated taxpayers similarly: borrowing from the 
Canada Child Tax Benefit, I would predicate EITC income eligibility on the 
household income of parents who live together but are unmarried. 
Currently, two unmarried taxpayers raising children together receive 
more favorable treatment than a married couple raising children together. 
This is because one taxpayer can file as single, the other as head of 
household; unlike a married couple filing jointly, each is subject to earned 
income phase-outs separately; together they receive a higher aggregate EITC 
than if they were married filing jointly.172 This presents as a whipsaw and 
runs contrary to the intended anti-poverty policy of both the EITC and head 
of household filing status,173 yet it is currently allowed by the Code. 
The current rules for claiming qualifying children are complex and 
cover many possible situations. The rules do not allow different taxpayers to 
171. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1). 
172. For illustrations of the resulting disparities between similar 
households, see Drumbl, supra note 17, at 127–129. 
173. The head of household status was enacted in 1951 as a way to extend 
tax relief to single persons with dependents based on an assumption that the 
household was run by a single parent:  
The income of a head of household who must maintain a home for 
a child, for example, is likely to be shared with the child to the 
extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the 
child. This, it is believed, justifies the extension of some of the 
benefits of income splitting. The hardship appears particularly 
severe in the case of the individual with children to raise who, 
upon the death of his spouse, finds himself in the position not only 
of being denied the spouse’s aid in raising the children, but under 
present law also may find his tax load heavier. 
H.R. REP. NO. 82-586, at 11 (1951). 
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claim the same child for different purposes.174 For example, if an unmarried 
couple with one child lives together, the mother cannot claim the child for 
purposes of the dependency exemption and the child tax credit while the 
father claims the same child for the EITC and head of household filing 
status. If both parents claim the same child on separate returns, the Code 
resolves the dispute with a “tie-breaker” provision that favors the parent with 
the higher adjusted gross income.175 
But the Code does allow parents filing separately to split different 
children between their returns in any fashion, so long as the various 
requirements are met. Thus, an unmarried couple that lives together with 
their three children can calculate which division would benefit them the most 
collectively based upon their respective income levels. In many situations, 
the couple benefits both by the fact that their incomes are not aggregated and 
also because they receive a collective standard deduction higher than that of 
a married couple. Take a very simple example, in which both individuals 
have adjusted gross income (all of it earned income) of $25,000. Using the 
inflation tables from tax year 2014,176 an unmarried taxpayer with earned 
income of $25,000 would receive an EITC of $2,155 for one child and an 
EITC of $3,945 for two children—collectively, the unmarried couple 
receives EITC of $6,100 for their three children. If, however, the couple 
were married and filed jointly, their earned income on the joint return totals 
$50,000 and due to the phase-out, they would have received an EITC of only 
$506. Economically, the households look the same: two parents, three 
174. A significant and notable exception is provided for divorced and 
separated parents (including parents who were never married and are now living 
apart). Section 152(e) of the Code permits the custodial parent the ability to grant 
permission to the non-custodial parent to claim the child for purposes of the 
dependency exemption and the child tax credit. In this case, the custodial parent can 
claim the same child for purposes of head of household status and the EITC. The 
non-custodial parent must obtain the custodial parent’s signature on I.R.S. Form 
8332 and attach it to his or her return. Note that this is the only permutation: the non-
custodial parent is never allowed to claim EITC or head of household status with 
respect to the child that does not reside with him or her at least half the nights of the 
year.  
175. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(4). 
176. Rev. Proc. 2013–35, 2013–47 I.R.B. 537. For the full EITC tables, see 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 596, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EIC) 29–
35 (2015). 
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children, and $50,000 of income. But one household receives $5,594 more in 
anti-poverty assistance than the other.177 
This current flexibility for unmarried filers, and the resulting tax 
advantages, is what drives some noncompliant taxpayers or unscrupulous 
return preparers to incorrectly file one parent as single and the other as head 
of household when in fact the couple is married (as seen in the example of 
the Ibrahim case). The noncompliance follows the opportunity and the 
money. If these incentives are removed from the Code, the rate of 
noncompliance allocable to the incentive should drop accordingly.178 
To address this inconsistency among married and unmarried parents who 
live together and to provide relief to married taxpayers living apart and filing 
separately, I propose that the EITC tables be restructured. Currently, these 
tables follow the filing statuses. Instead, I propose that the income phase-outs 
and EITC amounts be based upon household. Taxpayer parents living alone 
(i.e., if married, living “separate and apart” from their spouse) or with a 
taxpayer who is not the parent of their child should be entitled to the phase-
outs and amounts currently allowed to a single filer (the current EITC 
structure does not differentiate between single and head of household with 
regard to EITC amounts and phase-out levels, and I would keep it that way). 
Taxpayer parents who file individually but live with the parent of one or 
more of their children should be entitled to the amounts that would be 
allowed to a married couple filing jointly based on the couple’s aggregate 
household income.179 
To return to the earlier example: under my proposal two unmarried 
individuals, each with earned income of $25,000, must aggregate their 
income, and either taxpayer would be allowed to receive the amount allowed 
to a married couple with a joint income of $50,000. In this case, if the 
taxpayers chose to split their three children between their two returns, neither 
would receive any EITC; if one parent claimed all three children, the filer 
177. Additionally, the taxpayer who files as head of household receives a 
standard deduction of $9,100 as opposed to the $6,200 allowed to a single filer. Rev. 
Proc. 2013–35, supra note 176. Collectively, the couple enjoys an aggregate 
standard deduction on their individual returns of $15,300. Contrast this with a 
married couple filing jointly, which is allowed a standard deduction of only $12,400. 
Id. This is yet another tax advantage currently afforded to unmarried couples who 
cohabitate. 
178. See generally Book, supra note 72. See supra Part III.C (discussing 
Book’s theories of structural incentives for noncompliance). 
179. That is, following the model of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit 
calculation. 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   58 12/21/2016   6:16:46 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 452 
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately 
would be entitled to an EITC of $506, just the same as a similarly situated 
married couple would receive.180 
For similar structural reasons, I propose that a filer who lives separate 
and apart from his or her spouse and files a separate return should be allowed 
to take the standard deduction regardless of whether the spouse itemizes.  
a. Pros of This Proposal
The major advantage of this proposal is that it sheds the rigidity of 
marital status in favor of the reality of how income and expenses are shared. 
Thus, if spouses are separated more than temporarily, each can file as 
married filing separately and indicate on the return that he or she lives 
“separate and apart” from his or her spouse. And if an unmarried couple is 
sharing expenses and raising children together, this too should be taken into 
consideration. 
The EITC is an anti-poverty program, and this proposal is designed 
with that foremost in mind. Denying a married taxpayer filing separately the 
opportunity to claim the EITC makes sense only in a context in which 
spouses are sharing income and expenses and their combined income 
exceeds the income phase-out for EITC. In that context, it prevents the 
whipsaw of the lower-earning spouse claiming the credit while his or her 
spouse is earning an income well above poverty level and the couple shares 
expenses jointly. In the context in which spouses are living apart and not 
sharing income or expenses, it does not make sense to rule out EITC 
eligibility for married filing separately. 
In the meantime, plenty of taxpayers are unmarried but sharing 
income and expenses, yet can claim the EITC if individually each is income 
eligible. As discussed, this can result in a tremendous disparity between 
unmarried couples and married couples (with resulting structural incentives 
for symbolic noncompliance). This disparity may become more significant in 
scale if marriage rates decline over time in favor of cohabitation, with a 
resulting increase in the number of cohabitating unmarried parents.181 My 
180. The Canadian system defaults to primary caregiver as the credit 
recipient and includes a presumption that the mother is the primary caregiver. 
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), s. 122.6 (Can.). I would allow the 
taxpayers to choose for themselves who should receive the credit. In the event both 
taxpayers claim the EITC, I would follow something like the current tiebreaker rule, 
which gives it to the spouse with the higher adjusted gross income. I.R.C.  
§ 152(c)(4)(B)(ii).
181. See, e.g., Neil Shah, U.S. Sees Rise in Unmarried Parents, WSJ.COM 
(Mar. 10, 2015 2:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cohabiting-parents-at-record-
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proposal addresses that disparity by determining EITC based upon the 
combined income of the parents living together, which is how the Canadian 
Child Tax Benefit is designed. In this regard, the proposal addresses an issue 
much larger than just my concerns about married filing separately: it 
addresses the fundamental disparities that result from the Code using 
marriage as a proxy for economic interdependence. 
This proposal is the approach that I would favor the most in terms of 
economic results for similarly situated taxpayers. As with any new proposal, 
there are downsides to the idea. 
b. Cons of This Proposal
The major downsides of this proposal are: 1) it adds another layer of 
complexity for low-income taxpayers; and 2) while it will remove certain 
incentives for noncompliance, it will pose new administrative and 
enforcement challenges for the Services. 
As to complexity, it creates two new tests for taxpayers to wade through. In 
the current system, one only needs to know whether the taxpayer is married 
and whether he or she might meet the exceptions to be not considered as 
married under section 7703. Under this proposal, marital status is only a 
starting point; taxpayers must then determine whether they qualify for the 
EITC on the basis of living “separate and apart” from their spouse. This is 
not terribly onerous, given that these taxpayers will be looking for any 
exception that might allow them the EITC. 
The far more significant administrative challenge is that unmarried 
taxpayer couples with children would become subject to new rules and an 
income limitation that does not apply currently. The Service would need to 
educate taxpayers about the new rule and create new forms and schedules to 
help taxpayers determine whether and how it applies to them. 
As to enforcement, the proposal would create a new noncompliance 
incentive: cohabitating unmarried parents might misrepresent their address 
on the return so as to claim the higher EITC to which they would not be 
high-1426010894 (citing data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
showing “just over a quarter of births to women of child-bearing age—defined here 
as 15 to 44 years old—in the past five years were to cohabiting couples, the highest 
on record and nearly double the rate from a decade earlier”). The CDC data reflected 
an overall decline in nonmarital childbearing since 2007, with an increased 
percentage of nonmarital births occurring within a cohabitating union. SALLY C. 
CURTIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, RECENT DECLINES IN 
NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, NCHS DATA BRIEF, NO. 162 
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db162.pdf. 
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entitled if their household income were aggregated.182 The Service would 
have to crosscheck addresses in its enforcement data bases and undertake 
correspondence examinations for suspicious returns, leaving taxpayers to try 
and prove the address they used on the return was their bona fide address.183 
This opens up a new headache for EITC claimants, as the correspondence 
examination process is slow and systemically difficult to deal with;184 some 
percentage of taxpayers would face delays in receiving their refund or end up 
unfairly denied a credit to which they should have been entitled. 
The Service would have to disallow the use of post office boxes as 
addresses on returns, because otherwise that would be an obvious end-around 
for these taxpayers. Certainly some portion of taxpayers would get away 
with this type of noncompliance. 
Another complication is what to do when one unmarried 
cohabitating parent is a nonfiler. For the proposal to work, the household 
income must be known. It seems reasonable to require both parties to file in 
order for one to claim EITC: after all, they share a household and thus share 
economic incentives. But what if one of the parents does not have any 
taxable income, whether because he or she doesn’t work, receives social 
security disability benefits, or receives supplemental security income? 
Currently, these taxpayers are not required to file. Would the Service want to 
bring them back into the filing system for this purpose? This would greatly 
increase the number of returns the Service would receive for processing. 
Further, what if one parent was simply a chronic nonfiler? By the time that 
the Service caught up with that person via its underreporter program and 
substitute-for-return procedures, it may be too late for the Service to correct 
the amount of earned income tax credit claimed by the partner taxpayer. 
Should Congress enact a special rule extending the statute of limitation on 
assessment for such cases? 
182. Cohabitating married parents might also choose to misrepresent their 
address so as to claim the “separate and apart” rule, but in so doing, they would 
forsake the potential benefits from filing jointly, such as income splitting. 
183. Proving residence is already a very common EITC audit issue, but 
under the current rules the taxpayer is asked to prove he or she lived with the 
qualifying child for more than one-half the year. Under this proposal, taxpayers may 
find themselves trying to prove that they did not live with the EITC claimant for the 
requisite period of time. 
184. For a discussion of EITC audit barriers, see Drumbl, supra note 89, at 
132–39. 
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These are certainly not insurmountable challenges. After all, the 
Canada Revenue Agency has implemented such a system for more than two 
decades.185 But they would be new challenges. 
C.  A More Generous Idea: Allow One-Half the Credit a Single Filer Would 
Get, Based on the Married Filing Separately Taxpayer’s Income, Regardless 
of Total Household Income 
The third proposal is potentially the most costly but offers interesting 
economic advantages. This proposal would retain the emphasis on marital 
status and section 7703’s determination as to who is considered as married, 
and unlike the second proposal it is not concerned with household income. 
To the contrary: here I propose to ignore the household income altogether, 
and allow married filing separate filers to claim the EITC based on their 
income, but only the amount that is one-half that which an unmarried filer 
would be entitled to at the same income level. 
This proposal is different than the prior two proposals in that it 
potentially affords new benefits to married taxpayers who live together: it 
does not contemplate that they must live apart. Thus it extends beyond the 
sympathetic category of married taxpayers who have no choice but to file 
separately. For this reason, the proposal is specific to the EITC and does not 
contemplate changes to the other limitations on separate filers. For example, 
this third proposal does not contemplate that separate filers should be entitled 
to claim the standard deduction if the taxpayer’s spouse itemizes. 
Under this proposal, married couples with relatively lower incomes 
may be better off (measured as an economic unit) filing separate returns than 
filing a joint return. This is of course a departure from our current system, in 
which it is quite rare for any couple to be collectively better off filing 
separate returns than a joint return. 
At higher collective income levels, this is less likely to be true; as 
my examples illustrate, a relatively high-earning married couple still would 
be better off filing a joint return. Thus, many married couples who live 
together likely would still file jointly. But couples who are estranged are not 
penalized with the denial of EITC. 
While there are seemingly endless permutations that might illustrate 
this idea, I have set forth three scenarios below.186 When imagining these 
185. The Canadian Child Tax Benefit was enacted in 1993. For an 
overview of the Canadian Child Tax Benefit’s history and the overlapping tax 
benefits aimed at Canadian parents, see Kevin Milligan, A Reset for the Child Tax 
Benefit System, 34 INROADS J. 52 (2013). 
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examples, I considered that the estimated median household income for 
married couples was $76,509 in 2013.187 To use points of relative income 
comparison, I have chosen to illustrate a couple earning below, at, and above 
this figure. In each scenario, I assume the wife earns income of $20,000188 
and the couple has two children. Choosing this particular figure for the 
wife’s income is a bit arbitrary, but it needs to be relatively low to illustrate 
the proposal: an unmarried person with this amount of income would receive 
a significant EITC if she had at least one qualifying child (though the income 
phase-out would have already begun to take effect at that level). The 
question of EITC becomes less relevant (and eventually irrelevant) as both 
spouses begin to earn more; for this reason, I have maintained an income 
disparity between the spouses, with this disparity widening as the couples’ 
household income rises. 
1. Scenario Examples
a. Household Income Below the Median: Married Couple
Earns $60,000 
At the lower household income level, imagine a husband with an 
adjusted gross income of $40,000 and a wife with adjusted gross income of 
$20,000. As joint filers, they would not be entitled to any EITC because their 
$60,000 total income exceeds the married filing jointly phase-out for the 
credit. 
186. All examples use tax year 2014 figures and assume the taxpayers 
claim the standard deduction. 
187. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU ET AL., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013, at 6 tbl.1 (2014) (indicating that the estimated median 
household income is lower ($50,625) for a male head of household with no wife 
present and still lower ($35,154) for a female head of household with no husband 
present). 
188. In my examples, the wife earns less than the husband. Statistics bear 
out that this is the more common gender scenario (71% of husbands earn more than 
their wives in dual-earner couples). Wives Who Earn More Than Their Husbands, 
1987–2014, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/wives-earn-
more.htm (last updated Apr. 6, 2016). However, the percentage of working wives 
who earn more than their husbands in the United States has steadily increased in the 
past 25 years, and as of 2013 an estimated 38% of wives out-earned their husbands 
(this statistic reflects both one-earner households in which the wives were the worker 
and dual-earner household). Id. 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   63 12/21/2016   6:16:46 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 457 
for Married Taxpayers Filing Separately 
They benefit from the child tax credit, but their federal income tax 
liability on a joint return would be $1,866. 
If for whatever reason this couple chose to file two individual returns 
each using the married filing separately status, with the wife claiming the 
two children, the husband would have a liability of $4,028 and the wife 
would receive a refund of $1,804 (attributable to the child tax credit). As a 
unit, their liability is $2,224, which is $358 higher than their joint liability 
would have been. This is one illustration of how the current system favors 
joint filers over married filing separately. 
Imagine, however, if this proposal applied in this scenario and the 
taxpayers chose (for whatever reason) to file as married filing separately. 
Perhaps they are estranged but not yet legally separated. Perhaps they do not 
trust one another. Perhaps they have chosen to keep finances separate. Under 
the proposal, each taxpayer would be allowed one-half the amount of the 
EITC allowed to an unmarried taxpayer at the same income level. Assuming 
the wife claims both children on her return, the husband’s liability would be 
the same as under the current rules: $4,028. He is not penalized, but he does 
not benefit individually. This is because an unmarried taxpayer earning 
$40,000 with no qualifying children has surpassed the EITC’s income phase-
out threshold. On the other hand, the wife’s refund amount would be higher 
now, because she would be entitled to an EITC of $2,499 (one-half the 
amount that is allowed to an unmarried taxpayer with $20,000 of earned 
income and two qualifying children). Her total refund (including the child 
tax credit, which is the same amount as if she had filed separately) would be 
$4,303. 
As an economic unit they are better off filing separately than 
jointly—when his liability is subtracted from her refund, they net a refund of 
$275. Contrast this to the $1,866 they would have owed on a joint return: 
they are better off by $2,138 for having decided to file separately. 
Note, however, that unmarried cohabiting parents would fare better 
still (under both the current Code and this proposal). If both taxpayers filed 
as single and the mother claimed the children, they would receive an 
aggregate refund of $2,774.189 In this scenario, as is not at all uncommon, the 
189. The father would have a liability of $4,028 and the mother would 
receive the child tax credit plus an EITC of $4,998, resulting in a refund to her of 
$6,802. Note that neither can file as head of household because the father is not 
claiming a dependent. At her income level, it would be unlikely (though not 
impossible, depending on their expenses) that the wife can show that she is 
furnishing more than half the cost of the household shared by the four of them. The 
mother claiming both children is the most favorable permutation for an unmarried 
couple, though they have two other filing options: the father could file as head of 
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unmarried taxpayers fare better than the married taxpayers. This proposal 
would reduce the dollar amount by which this is true, but it does not 
eliminate the disparity or fully remove the incentive for noncompliance. 
 
     b. Household Income at the Median: Married Couple Earns $76,500 
 
 At this median married couple household income level, imagine a 
husband with an adjusted gross income of $56,500 and a wife with adjusted 
gross income of $20,000. They have two minor children in their home. As 
joint filers, they would not be entitled to any EITC because their $60,000 
total income exceeds the married filing jointly phase-out for the credit. They 
do benefit from the child tax credit, but their federal income tax liability on a 
joint return would be $4,341. 
 If the couple in this scenario chose to file two individual returns each 
using the married filing separately status, with the wife claiming the two 
children, the husband would have a liability of $7,450 and the wife would 
again receive a refund of $1,804 (attributable to the child tax credit; recall 
that her income does not change throughout these illustrations). As a unit, 
their liability is $5,646, which is $1,305 higher than their joint liability would 
have been. Again, this illustrates how the current system favors joint filers 
over married filing separately. 
 If this proposal applied to the couple and the wife claimed both 
children on her return, the husband’s liability would be the same as under the 
current rules: $7,450. His wife’s refund amount would be the same as in the 
last scenario because her income did not change: she would be allowed an 
EITC of $2,499 (one-half the amount that is allowed to an unmarried 
taxpayer with $20,000 of earned income and two qualifying children), and 
her total refund would be $4,303. 
 As was true in the lower-income example, under this proposal the 
couple as an economic unit is better off filing separately than jointly—when 
her refund is subtracted from his liability, they owe $3,147 instead of the 
$4,341 they would have owed on a joint return. Thus, it is worth $1,194 for 
them to choose to file separately. At this higher joint income level, the 
benefit realized from filing separately is not as great. This is true because 
                                                                                                                   
household and claim both children (while the mother files as single) or the father 
could file as head of household and claim one child, while the mother files as single 
and claims the other. The latter scenario produces an aggregate refund of $1,555, 
which is considerably more favorable than the outcome for the married couple filing 
separately in my proposal. In each of the three unmarried permutations, the 
taxpayers collectively owe less/receive a higher refund than if they were married 
filing jointly. 
Drumbl Pre-Publish.pdf   65 12/21/2016   6:16:47 PM
2016] Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting 459 




they have lost the advantage of income splitting afforded to joint filers. But 
the ability for the wife to claim EITC outweighs the income splitting in this 
scenario. 
 It is helpful to think of the couple as an economic unit when 
considering the fiscal impact of this proposal. But it is also important to 
remember that the couple may not be acting as an economic unit: if they are 
separated or estranged, the wife would benefit greatly from the EITC as she 
makes the transition from marriage to single parent household. 
 As in the lower-income illustration and as is generally true, 
unmarried cohabiting parents at this income level would still have a better 
outcome than the married couple filing separately in my proposal. No matter 
how they choose to allocate the children, the unmarried parents would 
collectively owe less than a married couple filing jointly; if the mother 
claims both children, they will collectively owe thousands of dollars less 
than the married couple filing separately under my proposal.190 
 
  c. Household Income Above the Median: Married Couple 
Earns $90,000 
 
 To illustrate the higher-income scenario, imagine that the husband 
earns income of $70,000 while the wife earns income of $20,000. At this 
income level, the incentives now shift if the married couple is acting as an 
economic unit because the income splitting becomes more significant. With a 
combined income of $90,000, the couple would owe $6,366 on a joint return. 
If they filed separate returns under the current law, they would collectively 
owe $9,021, a far worse outcome. 
 Under my proposal, the wife filing separately would again receive 
$2,499 in EITC, just as in the first two examples. However, even under my 
proposal the couple would now collectively owe more ($6,522) by filing 
separately than by filing jointly. 
 Presumably, spouses who live together and act in their economic 
interests would not make this choice. But as in the other two illustrations, the 
benefit to the wife is significant if the couple is parting ways, because she 
can use that EITC in establishing her new household. 
                                                 
 190. The father filing as single would have a liability of $7,450, while the 
mother claiming both children would receive a refund of $6,802; together they 
would have an aggregate liability of $648. Contrast this with the married couple 
filing separately under my proposal, who at these same income levels collectively 
would have a liability of $3,147. 
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 As with the other scenarios, we see again that a similarly situated 
unmarried couple would fare better financially than a married couple filing 
jointly or separately: no matter how they choose to allocate the two children, 
they will owe less collectively than a married couple filing jointly or a 
married couple filing separately under my proposal. 
 
          2.  Pros of this Proposal 
 
 This proposal offers a number of advantages that the second 
proposal did not offer. First, there is greater simplicity under this proposal. 
Fewer existing provisions in the Code would change because the marital 
determination provisions are left intact. Unlike the second proposal, it would 
not create a new class of issues for potential audit. 
 The proposal also narrows the level of disparity between unmarried 
cohabitating parents and married couples, though a disparity generally would 
continue at all income levels. Still, the proposal would at least decrease the 
magnitude of the incentive for married taxpayers to misrepresent filing 
statuses and engage in noncompliance because taxpayers would be entitled to 
at least some amount of EITC. 
 Importantly, this proposal could motivate the spouse with less 
earning power to work. This is a worthwhile policy to consider for a number 
of reasons. Currently, married women whose husbands work face a number 
of economic and tax disincentives to work.191 This proposal certainly would 
not erase all of those disincentives, but it could provide at least a small 
incentive to work. Specific to the EITC, one study found that expansions to 
the credit from the years 1984 to 1996 “reduced total family labor supply of 
married couples. In all cases, we find a decline in labor force participation by 
married women that more than offsets any rise in participation by their 
spouses.”192 
 Why does it matter whether the spouse with less earning power 
chooses to work? Women who do not participate in the workforce are at risk 
                                                 
 191. For an article describing these in detail, see Margaret Ryznar, To 
Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921 (2009). 
 192. Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor 
Market Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1931 (2004) (“these findings imply that the EITC is effectively 
subsidizing married mothers to stay home.”). 
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if their marriage fails or their spouse dies.193 Another angle to consider: a 
stated policy rationale of the EITC is that it offsets the regressive nature of 
payroll taxes for low-income workers. For married women with higher-
earning husbands (or the gender opposite—married men with higher-earning 
wives), the payroll tax is especially regressive, because they will earn social 
security benefits based upon their spouse’s earnings.194 This regressivity can 
be offset by allowing a wife who earns $20,000 to claim the EITC on a 
married filing separate return even if the household income exceeds joint 
income tax phase-out amounts. 
 Recall the two objectives stated in the legislative history to the EITC 
as originally enacted in 1975: (1) “as a way of decreasing work 
disincentives” for persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the 
regressive nature of social security taxes.195 The logic of these same 
objectives applies today for the lower-earning spouse. 
Empowering the spouse with less earning potential might incentivize some 
work over none. This potential upside to the proposal should not be 
overlooked. 
 
          3.  Cons of This Proposal 
 
 There are at least three drawbacks to this proposal: 1) cost, 2) 
blurring of the EITC’s purpose of reducing household poverty, and 3) the 
reduced dollar amount available to estranged spouses in separate households. 
This Section will address these in turn. 
 As to cost, this third proposal would be more expensive than 
proposal number two because suddenly many married parents living together 
would reevaluate their tax return and discover that they would be better off 
filing separate returns. And unlike the second proposal, there is no reduction 
in benefits to unmarried cohabitating parents to serve as a cost offset. Of 
course, my proposal to allow one-half the EITC allowed to an unmarried 
person at the same income level is just an arbitrary figure, and I used a fixed 
percentage for simplicity’s sake. Congress could enlist economists to 
determine a more appropriate amount (or percentage) of EITC allowable to 
                                                 
 193. JOAN WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN 
AND CLASS MATTER 25 (2010) (providing statistics on how even short periods out of 
the work force can impact long-term earning potential). 
 194. Sita Nataraj Slavov, Social Security's War On Working Wives, REAL 
CLEAR MARKETS (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/10
/17/social_securitys_war_on_working_wives_99940.html (arguing that for these 
wives “the payroll tax discourages work just like an income tax”). 
 195. JCT, 1969 ACT, supra note 126, at 222. 
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married taxpayers filing separately. It could choose to phase out the income 
level faster, or allow amounts on a scale that does not track the unmarried 
curve at all. In my view, any amount of EITC allowed to married taxpayers 
filing separately is better than nothing—which is what these filers get now. 
The second drawback is that this proposal moves away from the EITC as an 
anti-poverty program. First, it would result in a significant number of 
spouses receiving EITC despite living in a household whose income exceeds 
what the current system defines as needing a boost out of poverty. Note, 
though, that as household income increases and the disparity between the 
two spouse’s income increases, the tax liability will look like the third 
illustration: for spouses who live together, the loss of income splitting from 
filing jointly hurts them far more than any EITC benefit from filing 
separately would help them. 
 In addition, this proposal does not address what I describe as a 
current shortcoming of the EITC as an anti-poverty program—the fact that 
two unmarried cohabitating parents receive a more generous household EITC 
than Congress intended. As described throughout both proposals, there are 
many examples of unmarried cohabitating households far above the poverty 
line that currently benefit from the EITC because the lower-income parent 
happens to be eligible for the credit. 
 The third shortcoming of this proposal is that it does not do enough 
to help the group with which I am most concerned, which is low-income 
spouses who separate and have no choice but to file separately, at a time 
when they could benefit greatly from receiving the credit. Under this third 
proposal, such a spouse would only receive half as much EITC as he or she 




 Married couples overwhelmingly choose to file joint returns.196 
Married couples acting as partners and behaving as rational economic actors 
will typically file jointly for the sake of simplicity and perhaps for the 
benefits of income splitting. However, many married individuals do not face 
such rosy circumstances: they are in abusive relationships, they have been 
abandoned, or they cannot trust their spouse. A married taxpayer who elects 
                                                 
 196. For tax year 2012, the Service received 53,718,396 returns of married 
persons filing jointly. For the same year, it received 2,663,017 returns of married 
persons filing separately. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 27, at 77 tbl.1.6. 
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to file separately does not make this decision lightly. If the individual is low-
income, he or she faces an additional layer of vulnerability. Denying these 
separate filers credits that would otherwise be allowed is needlessly punitive 
and only compounds a difficult economic situation. In cases in which 
taxpayers are savvy enough to understand how the filing statuses work, the 
current rules also incentivize noncompliance because unmarried taxpayers 
are not subject to the same restrictive rules. 
 There are not clear policy reasons for denying so many benefits to 
separate married filers without regard to household income or other 
circumstances. Moreover, there is a curious lack of consistency among how 
various credits are treated when claimed by separate married filers, and a 
corresponding lack of legislative history explaining these differences. The 
current Code incents filing status noncompliance because of the disparate 
ways in which taxpayers are treated. The inequities resulting from these 
inconsistencies are further exacerbated by the limitations on amending filing 
status. One wonders if Congress has given coherent thought to how separate 
married filers should be treated, as it seems provisions have been enacted 
over time without much regard to the challenges faced by this filing status. 
With that said, the exception provided for by the Treasury regulations in the 
newest refundable credit—the premium tax credit—and the subsequent 
administrative guidance provide a precedent for creating exceptions, at least 
for the most sympathetic circumstances. The latitude provided by the 
premium tax credit exception is a small but positive step in the right direction 
towards recognizing the range of valid and sympathetic reasons why a 
married taxpayer might file a separate return. 
 I have set forth three proposals that remove the punitive barriers 
faced by these taxpayers. Proposal one is quite narrow and would not have 
broad application. Proposals two and three address not just the specific 
problems of separate filers, but also broader structural inequities in the U.S. 
tax system. 
 There are many other, less ambitious ideas to consider that might 
achieve relief for many filers who currently must file separately. For 
example, a simple approach would be for Congress to amend and liberalize 
the definition of “considered as married” in section 7703: if the measuring 
period were less than six months, it would be far less punitive to those 
taxpayers in marital transition. Likewise, Congress could remove section 
7703(b)(1)’s requirement that the taxpayer maintain a household for a 
dependent child. This would correct the bizarre situation under current law in 
which a taxpayer who is estranged but cannot afford a divorce, or who 
cannot locate his or her spouse, is nonetheless required to file a married 
filing separate return for the rest of his or her life. 
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 In sum, the Code’s current knee-jerk approach—a flat out denial of 
certain credits to separate filers—is overly simplistic and punitive. Congress 
should revisit it in some fashion. 
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